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Case Comments
Antitrust: Horizontal Territory Allocation
and the Per Se Rule
Defendant Topco Associates was a wholly owned grocery-
buying cooperative consisting of 25 small and medium-sized
supermarket chains doing business in 33 states. Each member
operated under its own name rather than that of Topco. The
association practiced no profit pooling ot centralized manage-
ment. Topco functioned principally as its members' purchasing
agent for more than 1,000 grocery items, approximately 60 per
cent of which were sold by the members under private labels such
as "Top Frost."' The association acted as trademark licensor
to members for these private-label products. Trademark li-
censing was conducted principally on a closed-territory basis;
generally, no member could sell Topco-label products in another
member's geographic market, and each member in practice
possessed veto power over entry of other members into his ter-
ritory.
The Justice Department sued to enjoin Topco's closed-terri-
tory trademark licensing program, contending that it was a per
se violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act for Topco members
to agree among themselves to allocate exclusive territories for the
sale of Topco-label products. The district court held for Top-
co, accepting the defense that Topco's trademark licensing pro-
gram was procompetitive. Topco convinced the district court
that only through use of cooperative buying power2 and a pri-
vate-label program s had the small chains which made up the
association achieved a significant position in the retail food indus-
1. The remaining Topco-procured products were unbranded. A
"private-label" product is one sold under a trademark owned by someone
other than the manufacturer, in this case a retailers' cooperative associa-
tion. 'Private" brands, such as A&P's '"okar" coffee, are distinguished
from "manufacturer's" or "national" brands, such as General Foods'
"Maxwell House."
2. The competitive significance of cooperative buying power is
discussed in the district court opinion, 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1034 (ND.
IL 1970), rev'd, 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
3. The crucial importance of private labels in the supermarket
industry is discussed in the Supreme Court opinion, 405 U.S. 596, 599 n.3,
and in the district court opinion, 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1035-36.
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try; 4 that while no single Topco member could have developed
a private-label program to compete effectively with the large
national supermarket chains,5 the members as a group were able
to do so; and that territorial exclusivity was an essential fea-
ture of the private-label program.6 On appeal, the Supreme
Court reversed, holding that the horizontal7 territory allocation
in Topco's trademark licensing program consituted a per se vio-
lation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and, therefore, that evi-
dence of the alleged reasonableness or procompetitiveness of such
restraints could not be received. United States v. Topco As-
sociates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).8
While the literal language of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
forbids every "restraint of trade," the Supreme Court has con-
sistently construed the act to proscribe only "undue"9 restraints.
One approach to a Section 1 case, therefore, is a "rule of rea-
4. Total 1967 sales of Topco members were $2.3 billion; if aggre-
gated, Topco would at that time have ranked fourth in the industry, be-
hind A&P, Safeway, and Kroger.
5. The district court found: "A competitively effective private la-
bel program to be independently undertaken by a single retailer or
chain would require an annual sales volume of $250 million or more
and in order to achieve optimum efficiency, the volume required would
probably have to be twice that amount." 319 F. Supp. at 1036. In 1967,
Topco's largest member had a sales volume of $182.8 million. Id. at
1033.
6. One of Topco's expert witnesses testified that the association
would experience considerable difficulty in attracting new members and
holding onto existing members without territorial exclusivity in the
private-label program. Brief for Appellee at 51-52 n.51.
7. A "horizontal" agreement is one among direct competitors. A
"vertical" agreement is one among firms at different levels of distribu-
tion, e.g., among a manufacturer and his vendee wholesalers.
8. Rev'g 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
The Court also held Topco's wholesaling restrictions, which amounted
to horizontal customer limitations, illegal per se, 405 U.S. at 612. This
aspect of the holding, which seems compelled by United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), will not be discussed at
length.
In a previous decision, the Supreme Court indicated that a per se
rule might be inappropriate should "a number of small grocers ...
allocate territory among themselves on an exclusive basis as incident
to the use of a common name and common advertisements" in order to
compete more effectively with large grocery concerns, United States
v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350, 357 (1967). On the surface, Topco appears to
present that situation. Presumably, however, the Court accepted the
Government's argument that "the members of Topco, with combined
sales of more than $2.3 billion, are hardly small grocers. Topco in-
cludes many large chains with significant market shares." Jurisdictional
Statement at 9-10 & n.11.
9. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
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son"' 0 analysis of industry conditions and of the purpose
and effect of the challenged restraint. A recognized defense in
a rule of reason case is a demonstration that the challenged re-
straint is in fact procompetitive rather than anticompetitive."
However, a number of practices, such as price fixing,' 2 tying
arrangements 3 and collective refusals to deal,' 4 have been held
"unreasonable per se" under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Once a commercial practice is placed in such a "per se" category,
it is "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore
illegal,"'15 and evidence tending to show the practice's "reason-
ableness" or procompetitive effect will not be received.
Despite ample dicta to the effect that horizontal territory
allocation is illegal per se under the Sherman Act,'0 the issue
was not firmly settled prior to Topco. The great majority of
cases involving horizontal territory allocation have also involved
at least one other trade restraint more clearly unlawful per se,"7
10. Id. at 62.
11. Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 597-98 (1936);
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 360 (1933). The
Court in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 360-65 (1963),
repeatedly used the term "anticompetitive" to describe practices which
will be held unlawful in rule of reason cases, implying that the pro-
competitiveness defense has continuing vitality.
12. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); United States v.
McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 351 U.S. 305 (1956); United States v. Na-
tional Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485 (1950); United States v.
Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241 (1942); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273
U.S. 392 (1927).
13. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S.
495 (1969); United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
14. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364
U.S. 656 (1961); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S.
457 (1941).
15. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (em-
phasis supplied).
16. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 377-82
(1967); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); Ford
Motor Co. v. Webster's Auto Sales, Inc., 361 F.2d 874, 878 (1st Cir. 1966);
Brownell v. Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128 (9th Cir.
1954); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427
(2d Cir. 1945).
17. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969)
(price fixing, profit pooling); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350(1967) (price fixing); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593 (1951) (price fixing); Las Vegas Merchant Plumbers Ass'n v.
United States, 210 F.2d 732 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 817 (1954)(price fixing, refusal to deal); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v.
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most often price fixing. Although Topco involved both terri-
tory allocation and a resale customer restriction, the Court's
treatment of the latter is summary and the decision focuses al-
most exclusively on the territory allocation. Prior to Topco
the Supreme Court had never invalidated a horizontal territory
allocation scheme without discussion of an accompanying anti-
trust violation, and the few lower court decisions dealing with
this precise issue are conflicting.' 8
Topco validates the dictum in United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co.,' 9 that once title and risk of loss have passed, it
is per se unlawful for a manufacturer to impose territorial
or customer restrictions on resale by his vendees. The Court
there rejected Schwinn's arguments, similar to Topco's, that the
market division was lawful because adopted "to enable [Sch-
winn] and the small, independent merchants that made up its
chain of distribution to compete more effectively in the market-
place."20 The Topco opinion removes any doubts created by the
Schwinn Court's express notation that only the issue of customer
restrictions was before it.
2
'
Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950) (price fixing, customer restrictions);
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898),
aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (price fixing); United States v.
Serta Associates, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1121 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd mem., 393 U.S.
534 (1969) (price fixing); Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F.
Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 417 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1969) (price
fixing, customer restrictions); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus.,
Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (profit pooling); cf. United States
v. Otter Tail Power Co., 331 F. Supp. 54 (D. Minn. 1971), prob. jur.
noted, 406 U.S. 944 (1972) (refusal to deal).
18. United States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563
(2d Cir. 1961), supports the Topco holding in the sense that it equates
territory allocation to customer restrictions, which are clearly illegal
per se under United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967). Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Williams Elec. Coop., Inc., 263
F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1959), held a territory-allocation contract between
two electric utilities void as contrary to public policy, relying only in
part on § 1 of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, Denison Mattress
Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962), held horizontal
territory allocation lawful where incident to trademark licensing and
where "[t)he division of territory was not the central purpose of the
contract." Id. at 409. The facts of Denison Mattress are quite difficult
to distinguish from Topco.
19. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
20. Id. at 374.
21. Id. at 367-68. As Chief Justice Burger points out in his dissent
to Topco, 405 U.S. at 617-18, Schwinn is a confusing opinion. The Court
notes that the territory allocation issue is not before it, but neverthe-
less discusses it; states that the case will be decided under a rule of rea-
son analysis, but nevertheless uses per se language; and holds that the
[Vol. 57:373
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The rationale of the Topco decision is uncomplicated; the
Court felt that prior cases had made it clear that horizontal terri-
tory allocation is illegal per se.
This Court has reiterated time and time again that "[h] orizontal
territorial limitations . .. are naked restraints of trade with no
purpose except stifling of competition." Such limitations are
per se violations of the Sherman Act.22
But as Chief Justice Burger's dissent2 3 forcefully demonstrates,
the majority in Topco went far beyond the requirements of
stare decisis and established a new per se rule. Horizontal
territory allocation alone had not previously been discussed by
the Supreme Court. Thus the majority opinion is internally in-
consistent in holding horizontal territory allocation illegal per
se after acknowledging that "[i] t is only after considerable ex-
perience with certain business relationships that courts classify
them as per se violations of the Sherman Act."2 4 Also disturb-
ing is the majority's reliance upon the dictum from White Mo-
tor Co. v. United States2 5 to the effect that horizontal territory
allocation is illegal per se, since the Court in White Motor refused
to apply a per se rule to a trade restraint before it for the first
time, expressly holding that it lacked the requisite "consider-
able experience." 26 The Court's description of United States v.
Sealy, Inc.2 7 as "on all fours with ' 2 8 Topco is also disturbing
since the Sealy decision held the territory allocation in question
illegal in the context of a price-fixing agreement.2
case involves vertical restraints, but nevertheless fails to explain why, or
whether, it would make a difference were the restraints horizontal.
22. 405 U.S. at 608 (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 613-24.
24. Id. at 607-08. The opinion here cites Van Cise, The Future of
Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. Rsv. 1165 (1964). See also J. VAN
CISE, UNDERSTADING THE ANTimusT LAws 122-23 (1970).
25. 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
26. This is the first case involving a territorial restriction in a
vertical arrangement...
... We need to know more than we do about the actual im-
pact of these arrangements on competition to decide whether
they have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack
* * * any redeeming virtue" and therefore should be classified
as per se violations of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 261, 263 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
27. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
28. 405 U.S. at 609.
29. Sealy is clear precedent for the proposition that Topco's ar-
rangement was horizontal rather than vertical, as it might appear at
first glance. A more detailed discussion of this point appears in Note,
Territorial Restrictions and Per Se Rules-A Reevaluation of the Schwinn
and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MIca. L. REv. 616, 631-32 (1972). Sealy would
also provide strong support for deciding Topco on an "aggregation of
19721
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Although frequently cited for the proposition that horizontal
territory allocation is illegal per se, the cartel cases 0 relied on
by the Court uniformly involved territory allocation plus price
fixing by parties with dominant market power,31 and therefore
are not direct authority for application of a per se rule to terri-
tory allocation alone by parties without dominant market power.
While the mechanism used to suppress competition in a cartel
arrangement is joint action by parties collectively possessing
dominant market power, the mechanism used to suppress com-
petition in the Topco situation was trademark licensing. Anti-
trust policy ordinarily does not condemn the limited monopoly
power possessed by holders of patents, copyrights, and trade-
marks. Ordinarily it does condemn the monopoly power pos-
sessed by a cartel, since a cartel arrangement effectively con-
verts a multi-seller industry into a one-seller industry. If the
argument of defendants is accepted, territory allocation in the
Topco context exists to promote effective interbrand competition
in grocery products through insulation of the parties to the
agreement from intrabrand competition.3 2 Territory allocation
in the cartel context exists only as a means of apportioning the
profits of an agreement to maximize total industry revenue
through price increases and restriction of output.83 Further,
trade restraints" theory, Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,
341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951), by considering the territorial and customer
restrictions together. The Court in Topco, however, chose to deal with
these issues individually.
30. E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593
(1951); United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United
States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as
modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). An excellent nontechnical discussion of
cartel theory appears in D. DEWEY, MONOPOLY IN ECONOMICS AND LAW
7-24, 158-78 (1959).
31. National Lead and Timken involved global market divisions
and price fixing by the world's leading manufacturers of titanium pig-
ments and roller bearings, respectively. Addyston Pipe concerned
market division, price fixing, and profit pooling by the producers of
more than 56% of the cast iron pipe manufactured in the allocated ter-
ritories.
32. Vertical territory allocation to promote interbrand competition
at the expense of intrabrand competition has been held not to be a per se
violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. Sandura Co. v. FTC, 339 F.2d 847
(6th Cir. 1964). However, the reasoning of Sandura may have been un-
dermined if it is correct to read Topco as severely limiting, or eliminat-
ing, the "net procompetitiveness" defense. See note 40 infra and accom-
panying text.
33. In the classic Supreme Court cartel cases, note 30 supra, terri-
tory allocation clearly could not have taken place without the dominant
market power which distinguishes the cartel situation from the Topco
situation. Since a decline in the number of effectively-competing
sellers of a product in a geographic market should encourage entry of
[Vol. 57:373
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Topco's territory allocation arguably had an important justifi-
cation in permitting a group of small trademark licensors to
compete on equal footing with large, powerful trademark licens-
ors.34 Cartel arrangements have the arguable justification that
they attain the most efficient industry-wide production levels
in the long run, but such agreements are clearly at odds with
antitrust policy in that they involve power to charge monopo-
listic prices. Territory allocation among parties with dominant
market power is therefore quite different from territory allo-
cation among parties without dominant market power, and it
should not be too quickly assumed that the same legal standard
should apply to both situations.
Despite the weakness of the Court's reliance upon prior
cases, the Topco decision does echo three recurrent themes in an-
titrust law. One is the notion that courts are unsuitable forums
to decide complex economic issues. Another is the consistent un-
willingness of courts to permit continuation of business prac-
tices which offer substantial potential for abuse. A third is the
more general Sherman Act policy of promoting competition,
competitors, it would make little economic sense for sellers of relatively
fungible products such as pipe, roller bearings, and pigments to allocate
territories among themselves unless collectively they possessed domi-
nant market power, i.e., unless most potential competitors were already
parties to the cartel agreement.
34. Another arguable justification is pointed out in Note, Territorial
Restrictions and Per Se Rules-A Reevaluation of the Schwinn and
Sealy Doctrines, 70 Mic, L. REv. 616, 635 (1972) (emphasis supplied):
In Topco's circumstances, smaller stores were given the op-
portunity to compete with the large national chains. Without
the -restrictions as an inducement, the stores would not have
been able to form the cooperative with its attendant economies
of scale. In this respect, the restriction was truly ancillary to
an agreement furthering competition. And if at some later time
the restriction did prevent some intrabrand competition, it
restrained a competition that had become possible only be-
cause the Topco arrangement itself had been so successful and
had facilitated the expansion of the member stores into new
market areas.
Establishing the truth of the italicized proposition is absolutely cru-
cial to Topco's argument that it does not fit into the fold of the per se
illegal market-division cartel cases. Topco would have considerable
difficulty showing that there was any business justification at all for its
territory allocation unless the proposition were proved. As indicated in
note 6 supra, one of Topco's expert witnesses testified that the private-
label program could not function without territorial exclusivity, and this
testimony was presumably one of the principal reasons why the District
Court held for Topco. In view of the importance of this issue to the ques-
tion of whether Topco should be permitted any territorial exclusivity
whatever, such as the five-mile-radius rule suggested in the text follow-
ing note 53 infra, it is perhaps unfortunate that the Supreme Court's
analysis of the case renders the issue essentially irrelevant. The Court
disposes of it in a footnote, 405 U.S. at 605 n.8.
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articulated in Justice Black's statement that the Sherman Act
"rests on the premise that the unrestrained interaction of com-
petitive forces will yield the best allocation of our economic re-
sources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest ma-
terial progress. '35
The Topco opinion notes the principal reason for a per se
rule:
The fact is that courts are of limited utility in examining diffi-
cult economic problems. Our inability to weigh, in any meaning-
ful sense, destruction of competition in one sector of the econ-
omy against promotion of competition in another sector is one
important reason we have formulated per se rules.30
This justification for per se rules appears in many antitrust
cases.8 7 There are of course many cases which do not fit into a
per se category and in such instances the courts presumably must
continue to make the difficult and delicate economic judgments
35. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958). Of
course, as Professor Bork points out, "the policy of promoting competi-
tion is only half a policy. Competition is the name of a process, not of
an ultimate desideratum, and so implies a further value." Bork, The
Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Divi-
sion, Part I, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 831 (1965). Bork states that antitrust
law should "distinguish consistently between agreements which 'regu-
late' or eliminate competition for its own sake and those which do so as
an inevitable incident in the creation of new efficiencies." Id. at 821.
He views this distinguishing process as one of interpreting the antitrust
laws so as to "maximize consumer want satisfaction" through analysis of
the extent to which a challenged agreement confers power to restrict
output, on the one hand, and the extent to which it creates efficiency, on
the other. Id. at 829-38.
36. 405 U.S. at 609-10.
37. Justice Black has noted that inquiry into whether any particular
trade restraint is "reasonable" proves "often wholly fruitless when un-
dertaken." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). The
opinion in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398
(1927), states that a court can only determine what is a "reasonable"
price "after a complete survey of our economic organization and a choice
between rival philosophies," a consideration which dictates the use of a
per se rule in price-fixing cases. Judge (later Chief Justice) Taft warned
that courts attempting to determine the reasonableness issue "set sail on
a sea of doubt." United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271,
283 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd as modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). And United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370-71 (1963), a merger
case under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, uses language strikingly ap-
plicable to the Topco situation:
[A]nticompetitive effects in one market [cannot] be justified
by procompetitive consequences in another ....
... We are clear ... that a merger the effect of which
"may be substantially to lessen competition" is not saved be-
cause, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits
and credits, it may be deemed beneficial. A value choice of such




which characterize the rule of reason approach.38 The Topco
opinion, however, appears to go beyond the argument that such
judgments should be made in as few cases as possible. The Court
suggests that it has no statutory authority to entertain the "net
procompetitiveness" defense that the lessening of competition in
Topco-branded products is justified by the increase in competi-
tion in the total supermarket industry:
Whether or not we would decide this case the same way un-
der the rule of reason . .. is irrelevant to the issue before us.
... If a decision is to be made to sacrifice competition in one
portion of the economy for greater competition in another por-
tion, this... is a decision that must be made by Congress and
not... by the courts.39
This reading of Topco, if accurate, has startling implications:
small firms may not work together in any way to achieve the
economies of scale which large firms possess, since in doing so
they must to some degree inevitably lessen competition among
themselves. Not long ago in White Motor Co. v. United States
the Supreme Court stated that vertical territory allocation "may
be allowable protectio[n] against aggressive competitors or the
only practicable means a small company has for breaking into
or staying in business. '40  Hopefully, Topco does not fore-
shadow a departure from the view that such arguments are de-
fenses in Sherman Act litigation, nor from the consistent inter-
pretation that the Sherman Act forbids only undue restraints of
trade.
Courts in antitrust cases have also repeatedly expressed
concern about the potential for abuse where a trade restraint such
as the one in Topco, found to be "reasonable" or "procompeti-
tive" at the time of litigation, is permitted to continue. Two
38. Justice Brandeis, in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918), indicates that:
[T]he court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the
business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before
and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint
and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all rele-
vant facts.
The Chicago Board of Trade opinion clearly balances the anticompetitive
against the procompetitive effects of the challenged restraint.
39. 405 U.S. at 609, 611. Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion, id.
at 612-13, supports this reading of the majority's decision:
The conclusion the Court reaches has its anomalous as-
pects for surely... today's decision in the Government's favor
will tend to stultify Topco members' competition with the...
larger chains. The bigs, therefore, should find it easier to get
bigger and, as a consequence, reality seems at odds with the
public interest.... Relief, if any is to be forthcoming, appar-
ently must be by way of legislation.
40. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963).
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abuses were already taking place by the time the Topco case
reached the Supreme Court. Customer limitations were involved
in the association's wholesaling restrictions,4 1 and the exclu-
sive-territory system was interfering with the orderly ex-
pansion of Topco members and of the association itself.42 In
several cases members had apparently vetoed competitive en-
try into entire counties in which the vetoing member held a
trademark license but did no business.
43
Potential for abuse is more obvious when a court is deal-
ing with price fixing than when it is considering territory al-
location. The Court in Topco reasoned by analogy in stating:
"The reasonable price fixed today may through economic and
business changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow.' '4"
The "power to fix prices ... involves power ... to fix arbitrary
and unreasonable prices," 45 and it is equally true that Topco's
power to divide markets, if upheld, would involve the power to
do so unreasonably. As a matter of statutory construction, courts
probably should avoid importing the express incipiency stand-
ard of the Clayton Act 46 into Sherman Act litigation. It is cer-
tainly arguable, however, that even if at the time of trial a hori-
zontal territory allocation scheme appears reasonable and
procompetitive, it is so inherently likely, sooner or later, to have
a net anticompetitive effect that it must not be permitted to con-
tinue under the Sherman Act.
41. Note 8 supra.
42. The potential for a third type of abuse in Topco, price manipu-
lation, is discussed in Comment, 12 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 1240, 1252-
54 (1971). Of course, some degree of price manipulation is actually an
objective of a private-label program such as Topco's. The grocer hopes
to build customer loyalty to his private brand and thereby to obtain
some pricing freedom vis-a-vis competing brands. The pricing freedom
enjoyed by a seller of a trademark-differentiated product, however, is
far less than that enjoyed by a pure monopolist or by a cartel, since
there is substantial cross-elasticity of demand among trademark-differ-
entiated products in "monopolistic competition." See generally E. CHAM-
BERLIN, THE THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION (1932); P. AscH, Eco-
NoMIc THEORY AND THE ANTITRUST DILEMMA 38-48 (1970).
43. Brief for Appellant at 7-9, 26 & nn. 8, 10, 18.
44. 405 U.S. at 611.
45. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
46. In International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947), discussing § 3 of the Clayton Act, the Supreme Court stated:
Under the law, agreements are forbidden which "tend to
create a monopoly," and it is immaterial that the tendency is a
creeping one rather than one that proceeds at full gallop; nor
does the law await arrival at the goal before condemning the
direction of the movement.
Under § 1 of the Sherman Act, on the other hand, the law presumably
must "await arrival at the goal," since a restraint of trade is not unlaw-
ful until it becomes unreasonable.
[Vol. 57:373
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Consistent with the antitrust policy of promoting competition
in the economy as a whole, a balance should have been struck
between the two competing goals of providing maximum com-
petition in the retail sale of Topco-label products and in the re-
tail grocery industry generally. Such a compromise should al-
low a healthy Topco private-label program, since such a pro-
gram is vital to the economic well-being of the Topco member
chains and thus to preservation of competition in the supermar-
ket industry. The compromise should also provide for some in-
trabrand competition in Topco-label products. Under this anal-
ysis, Topco's territory allocation should be considered a "per se"
violation of the Sherman Act only if it suppressed more competi-
tion in Topco-label products than necessary to achieve effective
competition at the industry leve147-that is, only if the territory
allocation were "capable of increasing the integration's effi-
ciency [but] broader than required for that purpose."48 An early
antitrust case involving covenants not to compete took this ap-
proach: "To sustain the restraint, it must be ... limited to
what is fairly necessary, in the circumstances of the particular
case, for the protection of the covenantee.149
Topco's arrangement falls under this analysis. The goals
47. The phrase "per se" is not used in the conventional sense here.
To elaborate on this reasoning, a horizontal territory allocation should
be held per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act unless the defendant
alleges a procompetitive purpose. If the defendant does make such an
allegation, the territory allocation remains "per se" illegal if the court
finds it more restrictive than necessary to achieve the procompetitive
purpose. Should the court find that the challenged restraint is not
broader than required to achieve the alleged procompetitive purpose, it
should proceed with a rule of reason analysis to determine whether the
purpose is, in fact, being achieved.
The tying arrangement cases, note 13 supra, provide a useful analogy.
A tying arrangement is illegal per se only when "a party has sufficient
economic power with respect to the tying product to appreciably restrain
free competition in the market for the tied product and a 'not insub-
stantial' amount of interstate commerce is affected." Northern Pac. Ry.
v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958). Neither in tying arrangement
cases, nor in territory allocation cases under the analysis advocated here,
is the per se rule used in an entirely mechanical way. The conclusion
of illegality does not follow immediately from the categorization of the
challenged restraint. The tying arrangement cases likewise proceed
to a rule of reason analysis if the two prerequisites for use of a per se
rule are not met. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp.,
394 U.S. 495 (1969); Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594 (1953).
48. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing
and Market Division, Part II, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 474 (1966).




of a private-label program would clearly be frustrated if
four supermarkets within a one-square-mile area all sold the
same private-label product. Although the grocer selling private-
label merchandise who seeks to build customer loyalty to his
specific store cannot do so if the customer can obtain the same
product at some other store, it cannot be contended that in or-
der to maintain a healthy private-label program, one Topco
member requires the power to exclude another member from
entire counties in which the first member does no business. And
as pointed out above,50 Topco's territory restrictions not only pre-
vent intrabrand competition, but impede the orderly expansion
both of Topco and of its members. On the other hand, healthy
private-label programs arguably assist small food processors, who
lack the advertising budgets necessary for effective promotion
of their own trademarks and therefore must sell their products
under someone else's label.5' The problem is not, therefore,
simply suppression of intrabrand competition versus promotion
of inter-chain competition in the supermarket industry. The
anticompetitive effects of Topco's territory restrictions on the
supermarket industry (interferences with growth of Topco
members qua members of the grocery trade) and the procom-
petitive effects of Topco's private-label program on the food-
processing industry are also part of the equation.5 2
The major failure of the Topco opinion is that it does not dis-
tinguish agreements broader than required to achieve the al-
leged procompetitive purpose from those no broader than re-
quired. It may be that in Topco's case, some suppression of intra-
brand competition is "an inevitable incident in the creation of
new efficiencies, '5 3 and therefore is to be condoned rather than
condemned by the Sherman Act. Survival of the private-label
program may dictate that, at a minimum, no Topco member
should be permitted to sell Topco-label products within five
miles of another member's store. If the Topco opinion's ration-
ale is fully accepted, however, such an agreement is just as un-
lawful as the one presented to the Court. It remains to be seen
whether Topco will adopt a narrower territory restriction and,
if it does, whether the Justice Department will choose to con-
test it.
50. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
51. The District Court in Topco so found, 319 F. Supp. at 1035.
52. It should be observed that Topco did not identify in its brief
any substantial evidence of the procompetitive effect of its scheme in the
food processing market.
53. Bork, supra note 35, at 821.
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Corporations: Shareholder Demand for Inspection
of Shareholder Lists and Corporate Records Lacks
Proper Purpose Where Shareholder Not Motivated
by Genuine Concern for His Economic Investment
Petitioner-appellant Pillsbury, a shareholder' of respond-
ent, Honeywell, Inc.,2 believed Honeywell's manufacture of
weapons and munitions was morally irresponsible and should be
stopped. He sought to learn more about this aspect of Honey-
well's business, to communicate his findings to other sharehold-
ers, and ultimately to solicit proxies in an attempt to elect one
or more directors who would represent his views. To this end
Pillsbury demanded production of Honeywell's original and cur-
rent shareholder ledgers and all records dealing with weapons
and munitions manufacture.3 After Honeywell refused two such
demands, Pillsbury petitioned for writs of mandamus to compel
production. 4 The trial court denied all relief, finding that Pills-
bury was interested solely in bringing certain political and social
views before the Honeywell management and other shareholders,
and therefore had not shown a proper purpose for his request.
1. Petitioner held 343 shares which, at the time of trial, were
worth about $50,000. He had ordered his agent to purchase 100 shares of
Honeywell stock and the agent, unaware of petitioner's designs, regis-
tered the 100 shares in the name of a Pillsbury family nominee-Quad
& Co. Pillsbury subsequently discovered that he had a contingent bene-
ficial interest in 242 shares under the terms of a trust formed by his
grandmother. Nonetheless, fearing that he was not a "stockholder of
record," he purchased one additional share on his own. State ex rel.
Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 324-25, 191 N.W.2d 406,
408-09 (1971).
2. Honeywell is a Delaware corporation doing business and hav-
ing its main offices in Minnesota.
3. The shareholder's right of inspection is provided by MINN. STAT.
§§ 300.26, .32 (1971); the Delaware counterpart is DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8,
§ 220 (Supp. 1968). For the text of these statutes see note 7 infra.
The trial court applied Delaware law, and on appeal both parties strenu-
ously argued the propriety of this application. The supreme court did
not reach the issue of applicable state law, stating only that the statutes
of each state were declaratory of the same common law test and there-
fore the trial court's determination was acceptable. State ex rel. Pills-
bury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 326, 191 N.W.2d 406, 409 (1971).
4. Mandamus is the traditional remedy for enforcement of the
common law and statutory right of inspection. See, e.g., State ex tel.
Humphrey v. Monida & Yellowstone Stage Co., 110 Minn. 193, 124 N.W.
971 (1910); 5 Fletcher Cyc. Corp. § 2251 (Supp. 1967). The evolution of
its application is traced in Note, "Proper Purpose" For Inspection of
Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970 DuKE L.J. 393, 394-97.
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On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
a shareholder's demand for inspection lacks a proper purpose if
not motivated by a genuine concern for his economic investment
in the corporation.5 State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc.,
291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d 406 (1971).
The common law or statutory right of a stockholder to in-
spect the books and records of a corporation derives from his
status as an owner of corporate assets and his interest in having
information concerning the management and the condition of his
property. 6 However, the stockholder's right is not absolute. To
protect the corporation, the right to inspect has been limited by
the requirement that the shareholder have a proper purpose for
inspection,7 usually stated in terms of a proper purpose germane
5. The court disposed of several allegations of procedural error by
affirming that (1) the trial court had properly determined the applicable
law, note 3 supra; (2) respondent in a mandamus action could an-
swer prior to the issuance of an alternative writ; (3) a deposition
could be taken before the issuance of an alternative writ and could
subsequently be considered by the trial court; and (4) petitioner was not
improperly denied a jury trial where the trial court found all questions
of fact answered by the pleadings and petitioner's deposition.
6. See, e.g., Sawers v. American Phenolic Corp., 404 Ill. 440, 89
N.E.2d 374 (1950); State ex tel. G.M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston
Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 22 N.W.2d 911 (1946); H. BALLANTINE, COR-
PORATIONS §§ 159, 160 (rev. ed. 1946); 5 FLrCHER CYC. CORP. § 2213
(Supp. 1967); 18 Am. Jup. 2d Corporations § 180 (1965).
7. See 2 G. HORNSTEIN, CORPORATION LAw § 611 (1959); 18 C.J.S.
Corporations § 502 (1939); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951). At the turn
of the century, judicial limitation of the right to inspection in addition to
an increasingly intractable attitude by managements led many legisla-
tures to codify an absolute right of shareholder inspection. A brief
discussion of these developments and a comprehensive review of such
statutes can be found in Newman, Inspection of Stock Ledgers and Vot-
ing Lists, 16 Sw. L.J. 439 (1962). With increasing corporate size and
greater numbers of shareholders, many legislatures relented and en-
acted the common law limitations as an element of the statutory right.
For example, MINN. STAT. § 300.32 (1971) provides in relevant part:
In all stock corporations the directors shall cause accurate
and complete records to be kept of all corporate proceedings
and of all stock subscribed, transferred, cancelled, or retired
and proper books, accounts, files, and records of all other busi-
ness transactions. All such books and records shall, at all
reasonable times and for all proper purposes, be open to the
inspection of any stockholder .... (emphasis added).
Similarly DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(b) (Supp. 1968) provides in
relevant part:
Any stockholder, in person or by attorney or other agent, shall
upon written demand under oath stating the purpose thereof,
have the right during the usual hours for business to inspect for
any proper purpose the corporation's stock ledger, a list of its
stockholders, and its other books and records, and to make cop-
ies or extracts therefrom. A proper purpose shall mean a pur-
pose reasonably related to such person's interest as a stock-
holder .... (emphasis added).
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to his interest as a shareholder.8 Generally, a stockholder has a
proper purpose if the request to inspect books and records at a
reasonable time and place is made in good faith, for a specific
purpose, and is not made for a vexatious purpose or to gratify
curiosity, nor for an objective inimical to the interests of the cor-
poration itself.9 Disclosure is normally compelled in the follow-
ing instances: where the shareholder seeks to investigate man-
agement and determine the financial condition of the corpora-
tion,10 where the purpose is proxy solicitation in opposition to or
for ouster of the existing management,1' where the shareholder
wants to determine the value of his stock,12 or where the desire
is for communication with other shareholders.' 3 Inspection has
also been allowed for aid in litigation against the corporation.' 4
Admission to corporate records has usually been denied when the
shareholder's purpose is to satisfy idle curiosity,'3 to harass or
8. See cases cited notes 10-14 infta.
9. Sanders v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co., 250 Minn. 265, 267-68,
84 N.W.2d 919, 921-22 (1957). This general statement appears to com-
port with the definitional pronouncements in other jurisdictions. See
18 C.J.S. Corporations § 503 (1939) and cases cited.
10. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905) (share-
holder can determine financial condition of national bank even though
defendant directors alleged resultant breach of confidential and trust
relation with customers); Winger v. Richards-Wilcox Mfg. Co., 33 Ilk
App. 2d 115, 178 N.E.2d 659 (1961) (second requested inspection of
executive salaries, bonuses, and expenses allowed three months after
first inspection completed); 5 FLETcsa Cyc. CoRP. § 2223 (Supp. 1967);
Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11, 30 (1951).
11. See, e.g., Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co.,
251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d 671 (1958) (not improper to solicit proxies
for purpose of attempting to change management); Morris v. United
Piece Dye Works, 137 N.J.L. 262, 59 A.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (submis-
sion of proposed plan of reorganization to other stockholders); Annot.,
15 A.L.R.2d 11, 77, 80 (1951).
12. See, e.g., Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905); State ex Yel.
McClure v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 177 Wis. 582, 187 N.W. 646 (1922)
(inspection of report made by private accountant hired by the corpora-
tion); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11, 42 (1951).
13. See, e.g., McCormick v. Statler Hotels Del. Corp., 55 I1. App. 2d
21, 203 NXE.2d 697 (1964) (communication with other shareholders "to
discuss the company's condition"); Lake v. Buckeye Steel Casting Co.,
2 Ohio St. 2d 101, 206 N.E.2d 566 (1965) (communication with other
shareholders "regarding the affairs of the corporation" a sufficiently
specific purpose).
14. See, e.g., State ex Yet. Floren v. Displayograph Co., 135 Minn.
479, 160 N.W. 486 (1916) (inspection by majority shareholder and presi-
dent to prepare defense to a charge of embezzlement); State ex Tel.
Humphrey v. Monida & Yellowstone Stage Co., 110 Minn. 193, 124
N.W. 971 (1910); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11, 83 (1951). The shareholder
as a litigating party may also avail himself of the discovery machinery
in a proper case. FED. R. Crv. P. 34.
15. The disapproval of "conducting a general fishing expedition"
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annoy the corporate management,'0 to further a speculative or
commercial scheme,17 or to obtain corporate secrets and aid com-
petitors.'8
Prior to Pillsbury, no court had held that a request for in-
spection lacks the requisite proper purpose absent a desire by the
shareholder to protect his investment. The court thus rejected
the argument that communication with other shareholders and
solicitation of proxies to elect new management are per se proper
purposes for inspection. Neither purpose was sufficient, the
court reasoned, upon a record which clearly showed that Pills-
bury's ultimate goals were wholly non-economic.' 0
The weight of authority favored Pillsbury's position that a
request for inspection of a shareholder list 2° to communicate
is asserted in News-Journal Corp. v. State, 136 Fla. 620, 187 So. 271
(1939); 5 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 2226.1 (Supp. 1967).
16. See, e.g., Morgan v. Howard, 293 F. 650, 54 App. D.C. 3 (1923)
(inspection denied because ulterior purpose was to harass and perhaps
destroy the corporation); News-Journal Corp. v. State, 136 Fla. 620, 187
So. 271 (1939) (40% shareholder, a rival news company, could destroy
by inspection).
17. See, e.g., State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Service Co., 1 W.W. Harr.
(31 Del.) 514, 114 A. 463 (1922) (access to shareholder lists denied when
only purpose was to procure and sell same for profit); Charles A. Day
& Co. v. Booth, 123 Me. 443, 123 A. 557 (1924) (inspection denied where
petitioner, owner of one share in each of three corporations, requested
stockholder lists for commercial circularization as he had from 2000
other corporations prior to the instant action); Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11,
49, 53 (1951).
18. See, e.g., State ex rel. Boldt v. St. Cloud Milk Producers' Ass'n,
200 Minn. 1, 273 N.W. 603 (1937) (those expelled from milk cooperative,
of which relator was one, had entered contractural relations wth com-
petitors and evinced a desire to abet same); State ex tel. Paschall v.
Scott, 41 Wash. 2d 71, 247 P.2d 543 (1952) (shareholder's dealings with
competitors detrimental to corporation).
19. Pillsbury did assert an economic interest: "This is distasteful
morally, and to me it's bad business to become involved in this kind of
manufacture." Petitioner's Deposition at 64. He expressed the fear that
such manufacture must give "Honeywell a very bad name among the
general public." Id. at 65. He felt that "more productive" and "more
profitable business enterprises" were open to Honeywell. Id. at 70.
Such market is very "unstable" and therefore "is endangering the invest-
ments of its stockholders, even endangering the job security of its work-
ers." Id. at 83. Honeywell's policies are "shortsighted" in that "I don't
think they understand the depth of my concern and the concerns of
other young people, the young people, whom, someday, they might want
to hire to help the corporation." Id. at 83.
However, the court's interpretation of the facts seems fair. Although
Pillsbury did claim to have the economic interests of Honeywell at
heart, such claim was likely in the nature of a recital, a mere allegation
to bring this request within the proper purpose doctrine.
20. The distinction between shareholder ledgers and other corpo-
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with other shareholders regarding plans presented by manage-
ment, or proposed by the shareholder himself, is motivated by a
proper purpose.21 When the communication concerns another
traditionally proper purpose, proxy solicitation, the shareholder's
position is stronger. Thus, in General Time Corporation v. Tal-
ley Industries,22 the court rejected the company's allegations of
improper and illegal purpose in connection with violation of the
Securities and Exchange Act. The desire to solicit proxies for a
slate of directors in opposition to management was held a proper
purpose reasonably related to the stockholder's interest as a
stockholder, and "any further or secondary purpose in seeking
the list is irrelevant. '23
The Minnesota court cited McMahon v. Dispatch Printing
Co. 24 to support its position that communication with other
shareholders is not per se a proper purpose. However, the share-
rate books should be noted. Prior to enactment of DEl.. CODE ANN. tit 8,
§ 220 (Supp. 1968), the burden of proof on the issue of the propriety of
purpose was allocated dependent upon the type of records sought For
examination of shareholder lists, the burden was on the corporation to
show an improper purpose. Insuranshares Corp. v. Kirchmer, 1
Terry (40 Del.) 105, 5 A.2d 519 (1939). For inspection of other cor-
porate books the burden fell upon the shareholder to prove good faith
and proper purpose. State ex tel. Waldman v. Miller-Wohl Co., 3 Terry
'(42 Del.) 73, 28 A.2d 148 (1942). The statutory language now incor-
porates this rule. DEr.. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220(c) (Supp. 1968). The
issue of burden of proof was not reached in the Pillsbury decision; the
trial court had decided that Pillsbury was not entitled to relief as a
matter of law, solely on the pleadings and Pillsbury's deposition. See
also text accompanying note 39 infra.
21. See, e.g., Chable v. Nicaragua Canal Co., 59 F. 846 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1894) (communication to oppose a possible reorganization); Hanrahan v.
Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 332 Mass. 586, 126 N.E.2d 499 (1955)
(communication about possible merger even though there was no spe-
cific merger plan then in existence); See also cases cited in note 13
supra; Newman, supra note 7, at 452.
22. 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
23. General Time Corp. v. Talley Indus., Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 533,
240 A.2d 755, 756 (Sup. Ct. 1968). The shareholder in Nationwide Corp.
v. Northwestern Natl Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87 N.W.2d 671
(1958), was an unregistered investment company which held a controll-
ing interest in two of defendant insurance company's competitors. The
Minnesota court held that interest in a rival corporation was not by
itself sufficient to deny inspection; it was not improper to solicit proxies
for the purpose of attempting to change the management of the corpora-
tion and consequently not improper to seek inspection to be able to com-
municate with, or solicit proxies from, other voting shareholders. It is
difficult to perceive why gaining control of, or changing, management is
considered proper and not "inimical" to the corporation whereas com-
munication directed at changing policy is not.
24. 101 N.J.L. 470, 129 A. 425 (Sup. Ct 1925).
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holder was denied inspection in McMahon because he had the
patently improper purpose of politically discrediting the com-
pany's president, a state officeholder. This purpose was not only
unrelated to the interests of the company and the other share-
holders, but also potentially injurious to the credit of the com-
pany. 25 The court's reliance on McMahon, considering the ex-
treme fact situation of that case, appears misplaced. Although it
is arguably justifiable, as in McMahon, to examine a petition for
elements which could defeat a proper purpose,26 there is little
reason to make lack of investment interest one of those elements.
The restrictive approach of the Minnesota court in insisting
on a concern for an investment interest has been rejected re-
cently in other jurisdictions. Primarily for social and ethical rea-
sons,27 the shareholders in Medical Committee for Human Rights
v. SEC25 sought to halt the production of napalm and proposed an
amendment of the Dow Chemical Company's charter for inclu-
sion in the 1968 proxy statement.29 Dow refused to include the
25. Other courts have also denied access to shareholder lists in
cases where the petitioner has failed to specify sufficiently the nature of
the communication. In Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
260 A.2d 428 (Del. 1969), the desire to communicate "with reference to a
special meeting" was not specific enough to allow a determination of rea-
sonable relation to interest as a shareholder. "If [mere intent to com-
municate] were the limit of the statutory requirement, any stock-
holder stating a willingness to pay the expense of a mailing to other
stockholders would be entitled to the list, regardless of the nature of the
communication." Id. at 429. In a laconic dissent, the Chief Justice
said that the statutory right was almost absolute and that communica-
tion concerning a shareholder meeting already scheduled was reasonably
related to interest as a shareholder. See also Note, supra note 4, at
402-04. For denial of inspection because shareholder lists were sought
only for commercial sale, see cases cited in note 17 supra.
26. Because of the discretionary nature of mandamus, courts usu-
ally look beyond the alleged facts for determination of proper purpose.
See generally Note, supra note 4.
27. In the original letter to the Secretary of Dow, the National
Chairman of the Committee for Human Rights wrote, "Finally, we wish
to note that our objections to the sale of this product [are] primarily
based on the concerns for human life inherent in our organization's
credo." Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 662(D.C. Cir. 1970). There followed a secondary economic objection to the
production in that it would jeopardize future recruitment efforts.
28. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 1970), dismissed as moot, 404 U.S. 403
(1972). For convenience, this case will herein be referred to as Dow.
29. Such shareholder proposals are provided for in the proxy rules
of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Management has the right
to omit a proposal if it is submitted "primarily for the purpose of pro-
moting general economic, political, racial, religious, social or similar
causes," 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (c) (2) (Supp. 1972), or if it is "with re-
spect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business opera-
tions of the issuer," 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c) (5) (Supp. 1972).
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proposals and the S.E.C. ruled that it would take no action on
that refusal. In reviewing the S.E.C.'s action, the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia took the position that a
shareholder may properly be concerned with the social and ethi-
cal aspects of corporate business.30 Similarly, the S.E.C. more
recently compelled General Motors to include in its proxy state-
ment two non-economic shareholder proposals of the "Campaign
to Make General Motors Responsible."31 The first was an amend-
ment of the bylaws to increase the number of directors by three;
the second would have created a "Shareholder's Committee for
Corporate Responsibility. 3 2 Thus it should not be assumed that
a person concerned with political and social issues prior to be-
coming a shareholder cannot properly be acting as a shareholder
when he subsequently attempts to communicate these concerns.
If a shareholder is not exclusively interested in return on invest-
ment, a corporate decision founded on profit-maximization will
not always be in his interest as a shareholder.33 Shareholders
30. The court ruled only that such S.E.C. actions were reviewable,
but by dictum chastized the S.E.C.'s administration and suggested
guidelines for the S.E.C. determination on remand. More important to
the instant discussion was the court's consideration of the shareholder's
scope of interests in the corporation:
No reason has been advanced in the present proceedings which
leads to the conclusion that management may properly place
obstacles in the path of shareholders who wish to present their
co-owners. . . the question of whether they wish to have their
assets used in a manner which they believe to be more socially
responsible but possibly less profitable than that which is dic-
tated by present company policy.
Medical Committee for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 681 (D.C.
Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the judicial review aspects of the decision
see Comment, 57 VA. L. REv. 331 (1971). For a practical look at and
criticism of S.E.C. administration see Clusserath, The Amended Stock-
holder Proposal Rule; A Decade Later, 40 NoTrE DAME LAw. 13 (1964).
31. For a comprehensive treatment of the Campaign see Schwartz,
The Public-Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign GM, 69
MIca L. REv. 419 (1971).
32. The Committee of fifteen to twenty-five members was to be
chosen by a board member of General Motors, a representative of the
UAW and a representative of Campaign GM.
33. Nor will a decision founded on profit-maximization always be
the corporation's only interest. With early 20th century economic the-
ory propounding the view that corporations sought only the greatest
profit, the courts naturally adopted the view as a legal predicate, par-
ticularly when it was assumed that the shareholder had only two inter-
ests: the return on his capital and the return of his capital. See A. BEu
& G. MEANS, TaE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932);
Schulman, Shareholder Cause Proposals: A Technique to Catch the Con-
science of the Corporation, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 19-32 (1971); Dodge v.
Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919). However, it is
evident from the change in economic theory that the corporation's sole
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have a broad range of interests, and a decision which refuses to
recognize this fact implicitly denigrates the shareholder's status
as an owner with the inherent right to determine the use of his
property.34
There are at least two factors which may explain why the
Minnesota court adopted this narrow view of shareholder inter-
ests. First, the court suggested that if a less restrictive standard
for inspection were established, "the power to inspect [might
become] the power to destroy" by permitting thousands of share-
holders to "roam at will" through corporate records.35 This ar-
gument is of doubtful application since the shareholder lists are
concern is not always profit; the corporation may adhere to a policy of
sales or growth maximization. See generally, Schwartz, supra note 31,
at 462-82; Note, 5 U. MxcH. L.J. REF. 68 (1971).
34. The Minnesota court, in a footnote, expressed no disapproval of
the Dow dictum that economic benefit and community service may
simultaneously motivate a stockholder, but held that Pillsbury failed to
meet the Dow test because he had no investment motivation for his
inspection. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 331,
191 N.W.2d 406, 412 (1971). This focus on motivation serves only to
obfuscate the pertinent import of the Dow decision, namely, that the
purpose of questioning the political and social facets of company policy
is a purpose germane to the shareholder's interest as a shareholder.
35. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 328,
191 N.W.2d 406, 410 (1971). For the "roaming at will" proposition, the
court quoted from Cooke v. Outland, 265 N.C. 601, 611, 144 S.E.2d 835,
842 (1965). In Cooke, the quoted lines were merely general prefatory
comments to the statement that the right of inspection should not be
absolute-simply window-dressing for the recitation of a well-accepted
principle. It is interesting also that the Cooke court, notwithstanding
its recitation of "roaming at will," reversed the trial court and allowed
inspection.
The implication of the Cooke quote is that corporate size and the
number of shareholders have grown to such a degree that perhaps the
archaic concept of shareholder inspection is due for revision. The right
of inspection arose during a time of small, closely-held corporations
when the number of shareholders was small and when it was a reason-
able assumption that a shareholder held a substantial interest in the ac-
tual management of the company. As corporate size proliferated and
corporations went public, the typical shareholder became increasingly
remote from the management and its decision-making process as the
process itself became almost incomprehensibly complex. To restrict the
number of shareholders eligible for inspection and to ensure a bona-fide
interest in management, many states have enacted statutes limiting the
right of inspection to those who own at least a certain minimum per-
centage of the outstanding shares of the corporation. See, e.g., ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 64-312 (1947); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-920 (1967); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 608.39 (1969); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.45 (1967); LA. REV.
STAT. § 12.103 (Supp. 1970); MAnqE REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 373 (1964);
MicH. ComP. LAws ANN. § 450.45 (1967); NEv. Rsv. STAT. § 78.105
(1970); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-28 (1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§ 624 (McKinney 1963); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 52 (1971).
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distinct from the other records and are required by law to be ac-
cessible at all reasonable times.36 Had the court made the prac-
tical distinction between the difficulty of producing shareholder
lists and that of opening other books and records, it could have
restricted the scope of its decision, limiting Pillsbury to the in-
spection of shareholder lists.3 7 The second factor was Pills-
bury's tenuous standing as a shareholder.38 There is an estab-
lished judicial doctrine that a shareholder cannot maintain a
lawsuit through the artifice of merely buying shares of stock in
a corporation. It is an implicit factor in inspection cases where
the shareholder purchased a few shares solely to gain inspec-
36. See the construction of DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 219 (Supp. 1968)
in State ex rel. Healy v. Superior Oil Corp., 1 Terry (40 Del.) 460, 13
A.2d 453 (1940); Mum. STAT. § 300.26 (1971) (original shareholder
ledger). It is arguable that the disruption of normal business caused
by such an inspection would not be as severe as feared by the court.
37. There is a legal as well as a practical distinction between share-
holder lists and other corporate records. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 220 (c)
(Supp. 1968) provides for a shifting of the burden of proof on the
propriety of the purpose. See note 20 supra. MINN. STAT. § 300.26(1971) provides an absolute right to inspect the original shareholder
ledger whereas MmN. STAT. § 300.32 (1971) provides only the quali-
fied right to inspect other books and records. See note 7 supra.
38. On July 3, 1969, Pillsbury attended a meeting of the "Honey-
well Project," a group which shared his views in opposition to the
Vietnam War. At this meeting he learned of Honeywell's production
of anti-personnel fragmentation bombs and decided to try to stop it. He
subsequently purchased the shares in Honeywell and requested the in-
spection. See note 1 supra.
We agree with the court in Chas. A. Day & Co. v. Booth,
123 Maine 443, 123 A. 557, 558 (1924) that "where it is shown
that such stockholding is only colorable, or solely for the pur-
pose of maintaining proceedings of this kind, [we] fail to see
how the petitioner can be said to be a person interested, en-
titled as of right to inspect.. ." (emphasis added).
State ex Tel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 329, 191 N.W.2d
406, 411 (1971). The fact situation in Day appears inapposite. Peti-
tioner, a dealer in unlisted, inactive and defaulted securities, there
sought the shareholder lists of three companies to advertise his business
and to trade in the stocks of the three. Such a commercial purpose has
been uniformly held improper. Petitioner had bought one share in each
of the three companies and had always sold his lone shares immediately
upon production of the lists. It is indeed understandable that the Day
court would have reservations about petitioner's standing.
The Minnesota court footnotes statutes from many states for the
proposition that one must have proper standing to request inspection.
State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 328, 191 N.W.2d
406, 411 (1971). With some variations, these statutes require that peti-
tioner have been a shareholder of record for at least six months and/or
that he own 5% of the outstanding shares. The fact that, while many
states have seen fit to so limit the concept of proper standing by statute,




tion.39 This rule is applied, for example, in derivative 40 and non-
derivative4 1 actions where the shareholder buys stock after he
learns of the acts complained of in the suit. However, these
usually are actions to recover for damages to shareholder inter-
ests and are therefore not entirely apposite to the Pillsbury situ-
ation. Nevertheless, the Minnesota court might well have been
influenced by the doctrines established in these analogous areas
of the law. That is, one who buys stock simply to harass the
corporation for purely personal, social and political reasons
should not be aided by the legal process.
42
On one level, the decision seems to dictate scrutiny of future
petitions for shareholder inspection to eliminate those with a
non-economic purpose. The shareholder who would contest com-
pany policy on non-economic grounds would thus be relegated to
communication, at his own expense,43 with other known share-
holders 44 or to use of the corporate proxy machinery pursuant to
the restrictive regulations of the S.E.C.4 i However, the decision
39. See, e.g., Chas. A. Day & Co. v. Booth, 123 Me. 443, 123 A. 557
(1924); see also note 38 supra.
40. See, e.g., Jepson v. Peterson, 69 S. Dak. 388, 10 N.W.2d 749
(1943). See W. CARY, CORPOATIONS 922 (4th ed. 1969).
41. See, e.g., Winter v. Southern Sec. Co., 155 Ga. 590, 118 S.E. 214
(1923). See also Sykes, Right of Stockholder to Attack Transactions
Occurring Prior to His Acquisition of Stock, 4 MD. L. REv. 380 (1940).
42. Much of the flavor of Honeywell's brief appears in the court's
opinion. "[Pillsbury is] attempting to change Honeywell's corporate
policy through 'institutionalized' means. He evidently preferred to con-
duct a more civilized form of corporate warfare than some of his con-
temporaries were waging." Brief of Respondent at 8. "Petitioner did
not attempt to determine for himself, by examining published or other
financial statements or reports of or about Honeywell, or by consulting
others, whether Honeywell stock would be a good investment even for a
scion of wealth [who] did not know or care where the money to pur-
chase the Honeywell stock came from." Id. at 8. "His only purpose
was to work within the 'Establishment' to promote his pacifist or re-
lated views of national relevancy and priority by proselytizing Honey-
well's other shareholders ... ." Id. at 10. "He is, in fact, proceeding
upon a 'domino theory' of his own, a term which is probably anathema
to people of his bent when applied to justify the war in Vietnam." Id.
at 15. "Such a result would permit any extremist or demagogue to
transfer his political campaign from the streets and public media to the
offices of corporations and the mailboxes of shareholders." Id. at 16
(emphasis added).
43. On the prohibitive expense of this course of conduct see Eisen-
berg, Access to Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HA v. L. Rzv. 1489,
1491-99 (1970); Schwartz, The Public-Interest Proxy Context: Reflec-
tions on Campaign GM, 69 Mica. L. REv. 419, 426, 493 (1971).
44. Obviously, if the petition to compel inspection of shareholder
lists fails, the shareholder will not know who all of the other sharehold-
ers are.
45. See Clusserath, supra note 30. For practical suggestions to man-
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more probably will be limited to its extreme fact situation. Any
shareholder seeking inspection of shareholder lists and records,
regardless of his reasons, should be able to succeed by alleging a
plausible connection between his purpose and the economic fu-
ture of the corporation.
agement on how best to thwart "shareholder democracy" see Marine,
Shareholder Social Proposals Viewed By An Opponent, 24 STAN. L. Rsv.
481 (1972).
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Creditors Remedies: Foreign Attachment Held
to Meet Due Process Requirements
Plaintiff, a Pennsylvania resident, filed suit in state court
against his former employer, a foreign corporation not regist-
ered to do business in Pennsylvania, seeking damages for an
allegedly invalid discharge from employment. Plaintiff then
caused a writ of foreign attachment to issue against the defend-
ant's in-state bank account balances, an amount in excess of $75,-
000. Following removal to federal court, the defendant entered
a general appearance and moved to quash the attachments
on the theory that the absence of notice and hearing violated
due process. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania denied the motion,' and the defendant
brought an interlocutory appeal. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, Seitz, C.J., affirmed the district court
ruling, holding that foreign attachment used to establish quasi in
rem jurisdiction does not violate the due process clause of the
14th amendment because the state interest in providing resi-
dent plaintiffs a local forum for actions against nonresident debt-
ors outweighs possible hardships for debtors caused by such pro-
cedures. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Finance Corporation,
456 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 41 U.S.L.W. 3168 (U.S.
Oct. 10, 1972).
Foreign attachment provides an unpaid creditor with re-
course against a nonresident debtor who owns property in the
creditor's state. In most jurisdictions a creditor initiates the
procedure by filing an affidavit in support of his claim and re-
questing that a judge or clerk of the court issue a writ ordering
the sheriff to seize or impound the debtor's property. 2 The at-
tached property becomes the basis for quasi in rem juris-
diction if the nonresident debtor refuses to appear. The property
also provides a fund out of which the creditor may satisfy a judg-
ment if he prevails on the merits. Foreign attachment is a sum-
mary procedure in that the nonresident debtor receives neither
notice nor hearing before the seizure of his property. This
1. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing and Finance Corporation, 326 F.
Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
2. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CiV. PROC. § 537(2) (Supp. 1972); D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 16-501 et seq. (Supp. 1972); MINN. STAT. §§ 570,
571.41 (1971).
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remedy, which is available only against nonresidents, should be
distinguished from summary general attachment procedures,
which are applicable to residents. Fewer than fifteen states
provide such general attachment procedures, many of which have
been found unconstitutional,3 while all fifty states maintain for-
eign attachment.4
Although most summary creditors' remedies have been
found to violate due process under Sniadach v. Family Finance
Corporation of Bay View,5 foreign attachment has survived be-
3. See note 5, infra. The Minnesota attachment and garnishment
statutes, Mn. STAT. §§ 570, 571.41 (1971), which allow summary seiz-
ure of the debtor's property where he is a nonresident, are as vulnerable
to such constitutional attack as any foreign attachment statute. In
fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court has already held that state's gen-
eral garnishment statute unconstitutionally violative of due process under
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View, 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
See Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Service, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176
N.W.2d 87 (1970).
4. In contrast to the relatively recent development of general at-
tachment, the origin of foreign attachment can be traced back through
early colonial statutes to that part of the law merchant known as the
custom of London. See Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior
Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 417, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233, 235 (1972). The
original purpose of foreign attachment was to gain quasi in rem juris-
diction in order to compel the appearance of the defendant.
5. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). In Sniadach the United States Supreme
Court, in an opinion by Justice Douglas, held that a Wisconsin statute
permitting prejudgment wage garnishments without notice and hearing
was unconstitutional because it authorized "a taking of property without
that procedural due process that is required by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." The theory propounded in Sniadach has been used to strike
down creditors remedies in the following cases:
Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. InI. 1972)
(innkeepers' lien law); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D.
Pa. 1970) (landlord's levy on tenant's possessions); Laprease v. Ray-
mours Furniture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716 (N.D.N.Y. 1970) (claim and de-
livery); MKim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (innkeepers'
lien law); Desmond v. Hachey, 315 F. Supp. 328 (D. Me. 1970) (im-
prisonment of a debtor); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa.
1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 991 (1970) (confession of judgment);
Arnold v. Knettle, 10 Ariz. App. 509, 460 P.2d 45 (1969) (garnishment
of wages and accounts receivable); Downs v. Jacobs, 272 A.2d 706 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1970) (seizure by a landlord); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor
Travel Service, Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87 (1970) (garnishment
of accounts receivable); Amanuensis Ltd. v. Brown, 65 Misc. 2d 15,
318 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1971) (required prior payment of rent as a condition
precedent to a proffered defense); McConaghley v. City of New York,
60 Misc. 2d 825, 304 N.Y.S.2d 136 (1969) (seizure by a hospital); Larson
v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d 712, 172 N.W.2d 20 (1969) (garnishment of
checking account). In the words of one commentator: "Within the
three year span since Sniadach first declared that the opportunity to
be heard must be 'meaningful' in fact as well as in theory, there has
been a literal decimation of prejudgment attachment statutes." Brown,
A Meaningful Opportunity to be Heard, 46 ST. JomN's L. REv. 25 (1971).
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cause of certain dicta in Sniadach. In that case, the Court stated
that "summary procedure [s] may well meet the requirements of
due process in extraordinary situations,"" and in support of this
proposition cited Ownbey v. Morgan,7 a Supreme Court decision
involving foreign attachment. Later in the opinion the Court
cited the Supreme Court case of McKay v. Mclnnes8 and stated
that although attachment "does not necessarily satisfy procedural
due process in every case,"9 it may do so in the case of foreign
attachment. The opinion maintained that an attachment which
lacks notice and hearing may be justified only in a situation
which requires special protection of a state or creditor interest. 10
On this authority, in foreign attachment situations state and
creditor interests have been found to outweigh the hardships
imposed on the debtors." With one exception, 12 the federal and
state courts have upheld the constitutionality of foreign attach-
ment procedures against challenges that they violated due proc-
ess, generally on the ground that the state or creditor interests
require special protection. 1 3 The Lebowitz case is the most re-
cent and highest level decision on this question.
6. 395 U.S. at 339.
7. 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
8. 279 U.S. 820 (1929). McKay was a per curiam opinion up-
holding the constitutionality of Maine's general attachment law against
a procedural due process attack on the authority of Ownbey v. Mor-
gan, 256 U.S. 94, 109 (1921).
9. 395 U.S. at 340.
10. 395 U.S. at 339.
11. For a discussion of the role of debtor hardship in this balancing
test, see Note, The Demise of Summary Prejudgment Remedies in Cal-
ifornia, 23 HAsTINGs L.J. 489 (1972); Note, Attachment and Garnish-
ment-Constitutional Due Process of Law, 68 MICH. L. Rav. 986, 1003-05
(1970); Note, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old Writ,
22 STAN. L. REv. 1254, 1266-67 (1970); California Supreme Court, 60
CALIF. L. REV. 759, 852-53 (1972).
12. Mills v. Bartlett, 265 A.2d 39 (Del. Super. Ct. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, Mills v. Trans Caribbean Airways, Inc., 272 A.2d 702 (Del.
1970). The court based its decision primarily on its interpretation of
Sniadach as prohibiting the garnishment of wages in any situation with-
out notice and hearing, an improper interpretation in light of the Su-
preme Court decision in Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
13. In Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100 (D. Conn.
1971), the court upheld the foreign attachment of defendant's home. The
court in Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567 (D.D.C. 1970), held that the
debtor-defendants' nonresidence under the District of Columbia's wage
garnishment law was an "unusual condition" within the meaning of
Sniadach. In Property Research Financial Corp. v. Superior Court, 23
Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), the court held that a situa-
tion requiring special protection to a state or creditor interest is present
in foreign attachment of a nonresident defendant's real property, and
that therefore, the statute authorizing its use does not violate due proc-
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The court in Lebowitz found such a state interest in effectu-
ating the settlement of disputes between residents of different
states and characterized it as a "compensating governmental in-
terest which supports foreign attachment."' 4  The opinion fo-
cused on the importance of foreign attachment for obtaining ju-
risdiction over the nonresident defendant despite the availability
of long-arm statutes designed to do the same thing. Ac-
cording to the court, the existence of long-arm statutes did not
alleviate the need for attachment prior to a nonresident de-
fendant's general appearance.15 The court emphasized that
without the benefit of foreign attachment the plaintiff may face
extended litigation concerning whether the defendant is subject
to the long-arm statute, and that the court may ultimately hold
that jurisdiction does not, in fact, exist. This situation may
substantially prejudice a plaintiff in effectively pursuing his
rights against a nonresident defendant. On the basis of this
interest and in deference to the Supreme Court decisions in Own-
bey and McKay, the Lebowitz court upheld the constitutional-
ity of foreign attachment.
The court expressed some reservations about permitting the
attachment to remain in effect after the defendant had made a
general appearance. The opinion noted that "typically, after a
party whose property has been attached enters a general appear-
ance the compensating governmental interest which supports for-
eign attachment loses its vitality."'0  Although the Lebowitz
court felt constrained to uphold the foreign attachment because
of the Ownbey and McKay precedents, it could have inter-
preted Sniadach as requiring the invalidation of foreign attach-
ess of law. In Robinson v. Loyola Foundation, Inc., 236 So. 2d 154 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1970), the court upheld the summary attachment of real
property in an action by a landlord against nonresident tenants for dam-
ages suffered as a result of tenants' breach of their lease.
14. 456 F.2d at 982. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63(1970), the United States Supreme Court identified the government's
special interest in summary adjudication. For a discussion of the view
that each state has the right to control controversies arising within its
borders and provide the protection of state courts to its citizens in their
dealings with nonresidents, see Attachment and Garnishment-Constitu-
tional Due Process of Law, 68 MIcH. L. R-v. 986, 1004 & n.83 (1970).
15. But see Smith, Sniadach and Summary Procedures: The Con-
stitution Comes to the Marketplace, 5 IND. LEGAL Funum 300, 317
(1972); Note, The Demise of Summary Prejudgment Remedies in Cal-
ifornia, 23 HAsTnGs L.J. 489, 511 (1972); Note, Attachment and Gar-
nishment-Constitutional Due Process of Law, 68 MicI L. Rnv. 986,
1004 (1970); Note, Attachment in California: A New Look at an Old
Writ, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1254, 1261-62 (1970).
16. 456 F.2d at 982.
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ment after the defendant has made a general appearance. In
the same paragraph in Sniadach in which the court cites the
Ownbey case approvingly, it goes on to note: "nor is the Wis-
consin statute narrowly drawn to meet any such unusual condi-
tion. Petitioner was a resident of this Wisconsin community
and in personam jurisdiction was readily obtainable."" These
sentences following the citation of Ownbey in the Sniadach
opinion have been interpreted by some commentators' 8 as re-
stricting the application of summary foreign attachment to those
situations in which jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant
is unavailable by any other means. 19
The comments of the United States Supreme Court in the re-
cent case of Fuentes v. Shevin20 lend credence to this interpre-
tation of the Sniadach dictum. In Fuentes, the Court held Penn-
sylvania and Florida statutes authorizing summary seizure un-
der writs of replevin violative of due process of law. As it did
in Sniadach, the Court in Fuentes recognized that there "are
'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and op-
portunity for a hearing," but noted that "these situations ...
must be truly unusual."' 21 By way of illustration, the Court
referred to Ownbey in a footnote, noting that it involved "at-
tachment necessary to secure jurisdiction in state court-clearly
a most basic and important public interest. ' 22 This comment by
the Fuentes Court emphasizing the necessity of the attachment in
Ownbey might be interpreted to mean that foreign attachment
is constitutionally justifiable only where no alternative means of
obtaining jurisdiction exists.23 By reading this requirement of
17. 395 U.S. at 339.
18. See, e.g., Note, Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L.
REV. 942, 950 (1970); Note, Garnishment Statutes and Due Process: The
Effect of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation of Bay View, 7 HAnv.
J. LEGIs. 231, 235-36 (1970).
19. In the Ownbey case in personam jurisdiction was unobtain-
able, there being no long-arm statutes existing at the time.
20. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
21. Id. at 90.
22. Id. at 91 n.23.
23. If this interpretation of the Fuentes citation of Ownbey is in-
dicative of the Supreme Court's view of foreign attachment, an up-
heaval in this field is in the offing. However, the sentence may also be
interpreted to allow foreign attachment in situations where jurisdiction
through the use of long-arm statutes is questionable and attachment of
the defendant's in-state property is the only certain means of securing
jurisdiction. Foreign attachment would be a necessity in such situations
as it would be the only way to prevent the prejudicing of a resident in
his dealings with a nonresident. The Fuentes reference to Ownbey is,
of course, only one sentence in a footnote. One idea that may be
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necessity into the Sniadach opinion, as others have, the Lebo-
witz court could have reached the result it wanted with re-
spect to post-appearance foreign attachment.
Some recent decisions upholding the constitutionality of for-
eign attachment have focused primarily on the security function
of attachment rather than its use to obtain jurisdiction.2 4  It is
argued in these opinions that the nonresident poses a special
threat to the creditor because he can so easily move his prop-
erty out of the state, thereby increasing the creditor's difficulty
in satisfying a judgment. The court in one such opinion, Prop-
erty Research Financial Corporation v. Superior Court,25 isolated
factors which particularly jeopardize the creditor's interests when
the debtor is a nonresident. The court first stated that
a nonresident has contacts and roots outside the state which
make it far more likely he will be willing and able to trans-
fer assets outside the state to defeat his creditor's recovery than
is true in the case of a resident debtor.2 6
Then the court pointed out that the element of surprise is vital
in summary attachments against nonresidents, the principle be-
ing much the same as that involved in allowing summary filing
of a lis pendens at the commencement of property litigation.
Although the Lebowitz majority opinion did not deal with
this argument, it has some plausibility. If a nonresident de-
fendant removes his property to another state, the removal may
jeopardize the creditor's security interest more seriously than,
for example, a resident defendant's sale of in-state property or
change of banks. While a creditor's judgment is entitled to full
faith and credit in other jurisdictions,27 the judgment can be en-
gleaned from that sentence, however, is that the United States Su-
preme Court recognizes the same interest in foreign attachment as does
the circuit court in Lebowitz-gaining quasi in rem jurisdiction to com-
pel the appearance of the defendant.
24. The District Court in Lebowitz, 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D. Pa.
1971), maintained that protection of the creditor's security interest by
providing a fund from which to satisfy a judgment is the primary pur-
pose of foreign attachment. The court in Property Research Financial
Corp. v. Superior Court, 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal Rptr. 233 (1972),
upheld a foreign attachment of the defendant's real property and
found the creditor's security interest to be the paramount justification
for foreign attachment.
25. 23 Cal. App. 3d 413, 100 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972).
26. Id. at 419, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
27. The United States Constitution, art. IV, § 1, states: '"ull Faith
and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by
general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof." For a general dis-
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forced only if the creditor is able to locate the debtor's prop-
erty. It is much more troublesome for a creditor to stay in-
formed as to the whereabouts of the defendant's property when
it is in another state, and if the creditor does locate the prop-
erty, he must expend additional funds in suing on the forum state
judgment in the debtor's state.
Judge Gibbons, concurring in Lebowitz, rejected such cred-
itor security interests as justifications for foreign attachment.
He concluded that foreign attachment should not continue af-
ter a nonresident defendant has appeared generally, since such
a defendant "is no more or less likely to conceal assets or make
fraudulent conveyances than is a local defendant. '28  Sniadach
requires that summary remedies be drawn as narrowly as pos-
sible and used only when genuinely necessary. 29 If nonresi-
dents pose no special danger after they have made an appear-
ance, continuing attachment is not needed and the statute which
permits it is not narrowly drawn as required by Sniadach. How-
ever, the premise of this argument, that nonresidents pose
no special hazard if they appear, surely is a matter on which
there can be disagreement.
One possible means of accommodating these divergent views
is a procedure authorizing the release of the attachment after the
nonresident defendant has made a general appearance,3 0 unless
the plaintiff demonstrates in a hearing that such release could
substantially jeopardize any judgment he might subsequently
obtain. Such a procedure would seem to be most equitable to
both sides. The procedure would provide for the possibility
of hardship to the defendant in that, if he were truly pressed, he
could make a general appearance, thereby releasing the attach-
ment. At the same time, the procedure would recognize the gov-
ernmental and creditor interests in obtaining jurisdiction over
the debtor through foreign attachment. The creditor would
not be substantially prejudiced by the defendant's nonresidence,
cussion of the applicability of the full faith and credit provision, see 47
Am. JUR. 2d Judgments § 1216 et seq. (1969).
28. 456 F.2d at 982.
29. See 395 U.S. at 339. Justice Douglas notes that the Wisconsin
statute invalidated in Sniadach was not narrowly drawn to meet an
unusual condition. He thereby implies that such specificity in drafting
is a requisite for a constitutional statute. An example of such a nar-
rowly drawn law is the absconding debtor statute existing in most
states. The statute usually provides for summary attachment where
the creditor offers evidence to show that there is imminent danger that
the debtor will attempt to remove the res from the state.
30. See Lebowitz, 456 F.2d at 982, 982-83 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
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since, by the defendant's submission to the forum state's juris-
diction, the plaintiff would be spared the necessity of employ-
ing a long-arm statute. The hearing at the option of the
creditor would also provide protection for his security interests,
which to some courts remains the most important function of for-
eign attachment. Furthermore, since it would be permitted only
after the defendant has made a general appearance and the plain-
tiff has requested it, a hearing would not substantially in-
crease the courts' caseloads.
In light of the Sniadach and Lebowitz decisions, the crucial
issue is no longer whether foreign attachment is consitutional.
Rather, the central question has become whether foreign at-
tachment statutes are narrowly drawn when attachment is con-
tinued after the defendant has submitted to personal jurisdic-
tion by entering a general appearance. The Lebowitz opinion
provides a starting point for judicial and legislative consid-
eration of proper responses to this question. Hopefully, the
courts and legislatures will consider procedures similar to those
outlined above in order to most equitably and efficiently deal
with the specialized circumstances of foreign attachment. Such
an ad hoc determination concerning whether to maintain post-
appearance attachment will be necessary to allow for the exigen-
cies of debtor and creditor interests in each situation.
1972]
Environmental Law: Standing to Challenge Federal
Agency Action Under National Environmental
Protection Act
Plaintiffs, an organization alleging general concern for the
environment and several individuals claiming residence in the
vicinity of the projects involved, sought a preliminary injunction
to halt the construction of two federally assisted urban renewal
projects. The action was based on the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969,1 which requires federal agencies to follow
certain procedures designed to compel consideration of the en-
vironmental impact of their actions. 2 The plaintiffs alleged that
the Department of Housing and Urban Development failed to
make an environmental impact statement for these projects in
accordance with the Act.3 Defendants, the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development and others, and intervening defendant,
the San Francisco Redevelopment Agency, moved to dismiss the
action. The United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of California granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs
did not have standing to litigate the issue.4 San Francisco To-
morrow v. Romney, 342 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
The standing issue in San Francisco Tomorrow concerns only
standing to obtain judicial review of an agency decision. The
federal law in this area has the reputation of being a "compli-
cated specialty of federal jurisdiction," and it "has been called
one of 'the most amorphous [concepts] in the entire domain of
public law.' "7 Although the development of the concept of
standing in federal jurisprudence has been long and complex,8
1. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as NEPA].
2. NEPA additionally constitutes a statement of national environ-
mental policy and established the Council on Environmental Quality.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331, 4342 (1970).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (c) (1970).
4. The court alternatively held that, even if plaintiffs did have
standing, a nonretroactive interpretation of NEPA would make it in-
applicable to the urban renewal projects in question. The retroactivity
of NEPA will not be considered in this Comment, but a discussion of
this problem is contained in 7 LAND & WATER L. REv. 115 (1972).
5. Although the concept of standing includes much more than sim-
ply that necessary to obtain judicial review, this Comment will discuss
only this area of standing.
6. United States ex rel. Chapman v. FPC, 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953).
7. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968).
8. Volumes have been written concerning the law of standing and
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several general requirements can be identified. Any test for de-
termining standing to obtain judicial review must consider the
constitutional requirement of "case" or "controversy." Histori-
cally, the plaintiff was required to show deprivation of a legally
protected right or injury to a special and peculiar personal in-
terest not common to the general public.9 A legal right was de-
fined as "one of property, one arising out of contract, one pro-
tected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute
which confers a privilege."'
However, requirements for standing have been drastically
liberalized in recent years.1 A significantly greater number of
plaintiffs since 1968 have "gained" standing as courts began to
use the "injury in fact" test exclusively. 12 In Association of
Data Processing Service Organization v. Camp'3 and its compan-
ion case,14 the Supreme Court in 1970 discarded a large part of
prior law and established a greatly simplified two-part test for
determining standing: "The first question is whether the plain-
tiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him injury in
fact, economic or otherwise."' 5 The second question is "whether
the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is argua-
its development. Treatment here would thus necessarily be superficial.
The following sources provide an excellent starting point for an in-depth
review of the law of standing: 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATmn LAW TaEA-
Tis ch. 22 (1958); Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a
Constitutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816 (1969); Davis, Standing:
Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHa. L. Rav. 601 (1968); Jaffe, The Citizen
as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or Ideological Plain-
tiff, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial
Review: Private Actions, 65 HAm,. L. REv. 225 (1961).
9. 2 Aml. Jun. 2d Administrative Law § 575 (1962) and materials
cited therein.
10. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939).
The legal interest test was overruled in Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
11. As early as 1965, the Second Circuit was prepared to break
away from the traditional requirements when it stated that "[t]he
'case' or 'controversy' requirement of Article I, § 2 of the Constitution
does not require that an 'aggrieved' or 'adversely affected' party have
a personal economic interest." Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 615 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941 (1966).
However, as the court noted later in its opinion, there was sufficient
economic interest to justify a grant of standing to the plaintiff. See also
Davis, The Liberalized Law of Standing, 37 U. Car L. Ray. 450 (1970).
12. Davis, supra note 11, at 450-51.
13. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
14. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
15. Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp,
397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970).
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bly within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.""' Although
the first part of this test simplified the law, confusion still sur-
rounds the concept of standing, largely because it is uncertain
what precisely is required to satisfy the latter part. Data Proc-
essing nevertheless significantly advanced the liberalized ap-
proach to standing which has enabled environmentalists to gain
much wider access to the courts than was previously possible.17
More recently the Supreme Court indicated its approval of
this liberalized trend in Sierra Club v. Morton,'8 noting that un-
der the Administrative Procedure Act 9 and statutes containing
"aggrieved person" clauses, lower courts have recognized that
non-economic injuries are a sufficient basis on which to grant
standing20 and that a person no longer must suffer an injury not
common to the general public to obtain standing.21 Never-
theless, the court there denied standing to the Sierra Club
16. Id. at 153.
17. See West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek Coal
Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. Cal-
ifornia, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc.
v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v.
Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Cape May County Chapter, Inc. v.
Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J. 1971); Sierra Club v. Hardin, 325 F.
Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 878 (D.D.C. 1971); Pennsylvania
Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa.
1970); Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970);
Crowther v. Seabourg, 312 F. Supp. 1205 (D. Colo. 1970); Citizens Comm.
v. Volpe, 302 F. Supp. 1083 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir.
1970). In all of these cases standing was based primarily on interests
that would not have been sufficient under the traditional law of standing.
18. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970) [hereinafter cited as APA].
20. The Supreme Court illustrated the broadening range of cog-
nizable interests in the following footnote:
See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund v. Hardin, 138 U.S.
App. D.C. 391, 395, 428 F.2d 1093, 1097 (interest in health af-
fected by decision of Secretary of Agriculture refusing to sus-
pend registration of certain pesticides containing DDT); Office
of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 123
U.S. App. D.C. 328, 339, 359 F.2d 994, 1005 (interest of television
viewers in the programming of a local station licensed by the
FCC); Scenic Hudson Preservation Conf. v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608,
615-616 (interests in aesthetics, recreation, and orderly commu-
nity planning affected by FPC licensing of a hydroelectric proj-
ect); Reade v. Ewing, 205 F.2d 630, 631-632 (interest of con-
sumers of oleomargarine in fair labeling of product regulated
by Federal Security Administration); Crowther v. Seabourg, 312
F. Supp. 1205, 1212 (interests in health and safety of persons re-
siding near the site of a proposed atomic blast).
405 U.S. at 738 n.13.
21. 405 U.S. at 727.
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to contest Forest Service approval of a skiing development
in a national forest,22 stating that "[t]he 'injury in fact' test
requires more than an injury to a cognizable interest. It requires
that the party seeking review be himself among the injured. '23
Since the Sierra Club is one of the foremost groups striving to
protect the wilderness environment, a denial of standing to the
group itself assumes added significance. Apparently no conser-
vation group will now be granted standing unless one of its in-
dividual members is injured. Yet for an organization like the
Sierra Club, this requirement should not prove fatal since, in the
usual case, at least one of its thousands of members should be
able to allege injury by the agency action.
It is unclear whether or not San Francisco Tomorrow was de-
cided under the liberalized law of standing. There were two dis-
tinct standing issues which the court failed to consider sepa-
rately: that of the organization itself and that of its members
who sued in their individual capacities. As to the organization,
standing arguably was correctly denied under the reasoning of
Sierra Club.24 The court's analysis of the standing issue with
respect to the individual plaintiffs, however, appears not to have
taken recent developments in the law of standing into account -25
Thus, although it seems clear that economic injury is no longer a
prerequisite to standing, the court premised its denial of standing
upon the principle that a "mere non-pecuniary interest in the
subject matter of a statute" is legally insufficient,2 0 and that the
22. It is unclear what result would have obtained had the Sierra
Club not been unwilling to allege injury to several of its individual
members. Two results would have been possible: (1) dismissal as to
the Club itself for lack of standing but not as to the injured members
suing in their individual capacities; or (2) standing granted to the Sierra
Club as representative of its individually injured members. The argu-
ment that an organization should have standing to represent its mem-
bers who have been injured individually (as, for example, by agency
approval of a dam on a river which would flood the hunting area of a
member) has been rejected by at least one court. See Alameda Conser-
vation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 908 (1971). However, the issue has not been conclusively deter-
mined.
23. 405 U.S. at 734-35. Cf. West Virginia Highlands Conservancy
v. Island Creek Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971).
24. Although Sierra Club would appear to be dispositive of this is-
sue (but see note 22 supra), the court cited but did not discuss that case.
Rather, the court did not engage in analysis of prior standing cases,
apparently on the principle that such cases either are irreconcilable or so
unique as to be irrelevant in deciding new cases with differing fact
situations. 342 F. Supp. at 80.
25. See text accompanying notes 15-21 supra.
26. 342 F. Supp. at 81.
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injury must not be common to the general public. 27 An analysis,
and treatment of organizational and individual standing as dis-
crete issues might well have led the court to a different con-
clusion.28
It can be persuasively argued that standing should have
been granted to the plaintiffs who alleged specific, individual in-
jury. As other courts have held, 29 the application of the Data
Processing ° test in conjunction with the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA)3 1 would have satisfied standing requirements.
First, the APA provides that
[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or
adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review
thereof.32
This right to review is unqualified unless the "relevant statute"
(in this case, NEPA) specifically excludes such review or com-
mits the decision to agency discretion, 33 neither of which applies
to NEPA. Second, Data Processing held that "injury in fact"
was sufficient to satisfy the "adversely affected" language of the
APA.34 The individual plaintiffs' allegation of concern for their
welfare as it might be affected by the nearby housing projects
would seem sufficient to satisfy the emerging "injury in fact"
27. The court pointed out that the plaintiffs claimed "no prop-
erty or other legal interests in the projects or properties included therein
or adjacent thereto any greater than or different from that possessed
by the citizenry at large." 342 F. Supp. at 79. The court also observed
that "it appears that in each case where standing has been recognized,
the plaintiff has borne some special relationship to the statute or to its
subject matter, or to its enforcement, which distinguishes him from the
common body of citizens." Id. at 80.
28. The dismissal as to the individual plaintiffs for lack of stand-
ing seems particularly surprising in light of a recent decision by the
Ninth Circuit, the circuit in which the San Francisco Tomorrow court sits.
In Alameda Conservation Ass'n v. California, 437 F.2d 1087 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971), standing was denied to the conserva-
tion group but granted to individual members residing near a proposed
land exchange who alleged
"destruction of fisheries and wildlife from which plaintiffs per-
sonally benefit" and [destruction of] the flushing characteristics
of the bay affecting the climate around them.
Id. at 1091.
29. See, e.g., West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Island Creek
Coal Co., 441 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Pennsylvania
Environmental Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
30. See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
31. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970).
32. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
33. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
34. See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
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test.35 Finally, it would seem that the second part of the Data
Processing test, concerning the "zone of interests" to be protected
by the "relevant statute,"36 arguably is met in this case.37 Thus
it would appear that, at a minimum, the individual plaintiffs
should have been granted standing to contest HUD's failure to
make an environmental impact statement.
The San Francisco Tomorrow court did not accept the view
that protection of the public interest requires judicial review of
agency decisions3" and mandates application of the liberalized
rules of standing in the area of environmental protection. En-
vironmental protection suits are different from many civil suits
because their major purpose is to protect the public interest
rather than to obtain a private remedy. The individuals and
groups which bring environmental actions are not motivated by
hope of financial gain or fear of economic loss. They are inter-
ested in protecting the earth's natural resources, nature's beauty
and the entire "ecosphere." 39 The "case" or "controversy" re-
quirement for environmental actions thus should not be analyzed
in the same manner as private actions. The concreteness of the
environmental action cannot be discovered in terms of monetary
injury, but rather in the fact that the individual or group has
expended the great amount of time and money necessary to chal-
lenge an administrative action.40
The traditional principle that a widely suffered injury is not
sufficient to provide standing is also inappropriate in an environ-
35. See note 20 supra.
36. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
37. See text following note 49 infra.
38. At one point the court stated that the Constitution makes it
the President's responsibility to execute the laws, and that the President
appointed the defendants (Secretary of H=D, et al.) to assist him, not
the plaintiffs. The court did not suggest what recourse is available to
an aggrieved person should the President or his assistants fail to
properly execute the laws and protect the public interest. 342 F. Supp.
at 81.
39. Here, several billion years ago, life appeared and was
nourished by the earth's substance. As it grew, life evolved,
its old forms transforming the earth's skin and new ones adapt-
ing to these changes. Living things multiplied in number,
variety, and habitat until they formed a global network, be-
coming deftly enmeshed in the surroundings they had them-
selves created. This is the ecosphere, the home that life has
built for itself on the planet's outer surface.
Any living thing that hopes to live on the earth must fit into
the ecosphere or perish.
B. CommoNm, TtE CLOSING CmCLE 11 (1971).
40. At least one court has recognized this fact. See Citizens' Comm.
for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 103 (2d Cir. 1970).
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mental action. No injury to the environment is peculiar to an in-
dividual or a small group of people, because such injury inevita-
bly affects the entire ecosphere and, therefore, all individuals.
Since the application of this traditional principle would often
preclude any effective remedy for acts causing damage to the
environment, it should be liscarded.
In enacting NEPA, Congress recognized both the need to pro-
tect the environment 4 ' and the desirability of involving par-
ties representing all points of view at every stage of the plan-
ning.42 Congress thus indicated that every individual should be
responsible for protecting the environment.43 President Nixon
also has recognized the need for involving the knowledge and ex-
pertise of the public in these decisions by ordering
the heads or Federal agencies [to] . . . [d]evelop procedures to
ensure the fullest practicable provisions of timely public infor-
mation and understanding of Federal plans and programs with
environmental impact, in order to obtain the views of interested
parties.44
NEPA, its legislative history, and the executive orders issued
concerning its implementation leave no doubt but that it is a
fundamental policy objective to involve the public in the plan-
41. The Senate section by section analysis states:
This subsection asserts congressional recognition of each per-
son's fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful environ-
ment. It is apparent that the guarantee of the continued enjoy-
ment of any individual right is dependent upon individual
health and safety. It is further apparent that deprivation of an
individual's right to a healthful environment will result in the
degradation or elimination of all his rights.
115 CONG. REc. 29085 (1969).
42. Many of the environmental controversies of recent years
have, in large measure, been caused by the failure to consider
all relevant points of view in the planning and conduct of Fed-
eral activities. Using an interdisciplinary approach that brought
together the skills of the landscape architect, the engineer, the
ecologist, the economist, and other relevant disciplines would re-
sult in better planning and better projects. Too often the plan-
ning is the exclusive province of the engineer and cost analyst.
Id. (Section by section analysis of NEPA).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(c) (1970), and the Senate section by section
analysis which states:
The subsection also asserts congressional recognition of each
individual's responsibility to contribute to the preservation and
enhancement of the environment. The enjoyment of individual
rights requires respect and protection of the rights of others.
The cumulative influence of each individual upon the environ-
ment is of such great significance that every effort to preserve
environmental quality must depend upon the strong support
and participation of the public.
115 CONG. REc. 29085 (1969).
44. Exec. Order No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 104, 105 (1970).
[Vol. 57:404
CASE COMMENTS
ning process of federal projects to ensure that the environmental
impact is considered.
When an administrative agency threatens injury to the en-
vironment, groups such as the Sierra Club and the Environ-
mental Defense Fund and concerned individuals should be al-
lowed to intervene at the agency level and, if necessary, obtain
review in the courts.4 5 It has been argued that the agencies,
rather than concerned groups and individuals, are charged with
protecting the public interest. Unfortunately, agency decisions
are not always based upon what is best for the public. Thus one
of the factors contributing to the liberalization of the rules of
standing
is the increasing awareness that administrative agencies, both
executive and independent, do not necessarily operate in the
public interest. This is especially true as agencies grow older
and stagnate in an adopted point of view handed down through
the years. Agency stagnation is inevitably accompanied or
caused by insulation from the totality of pressures which lead to
decisions in the public interest, leaving only the "special interest
groups" to be heeded.46
Various factors may enable special interest groups to obtain
agency decisions inimical to either the mandates of Congress or
the public interest.47 In this situation, the courts may realistic-
ally be the only forum capable of providing a timely remedy.
Failure to allow concerned groups and individuals to intervene
at the agency level or obtain judicial review of agency decisions
will not only increase "the general feeling of the body politic of
exclusion and alienation from government," 48 but also allow
agencies to completely ignore NEPA. Without the assistance of
concerned groups and individuals, Congress might in some in-
stances find it difficult to protect the environment.4 9
If the congressional policy of involvement of environmental-
ists is to be implemented, the requirements for standing must be
45. This is the thesis of this Comment notwithstanding Sierra
Club's denial of standing to the organization absent injury to specific
members. See text accompanying notes 18-23 supra.
46. Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen
Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RuiGEr L.
REv. 230, 245-46 (1970).
47. See, e.g., Shannon, 'Like it or not,' It's the Way the System
Works, Minneapolis Tribune, Sept. 18, 1972, at 8A, col 1.
48. Hanks & Hanks, supra note 46, at 246.
49. One of the most potent weapons in marshalling public
opinion and challenging governmental agency and industrial
pollution has been legal action by conservation groups through-
out the United States.
Choulos, Go Back-You Forgot to Say "May I!" or Standing in Environ-
mental Litigation, 6 LINcoLN L. REv. 127 (1971).
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revised. Of primary importance is the elimination of the second
part of the Data Processing test concerning "whether the interest
sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question."50  This part of the test
has been criticized as
(1) analytically faulty, (2) contrary to much case law the Court
should not have intended to overrule, (3) cumbersome, incon-
venient, and artificial, and (4) at variance with the dominant in-
tent behind the Administrative Procedure Act.51
Also, this part more properly goes to the issue of reviewability
than to standing.52 Courts should be able to decide the issue of
standing without going to the statutory interpretation issue,
which must again be faced in deciding the question of review-
ability. As Justice Brennan has persuasively argued,
in making such examination of statutory materials an element
in the determination of standing, the Court not only performs a
useless and unnecessary exercise but also encourages badly
written decisions, which may well deny justice in this complex
field. When agency action is challenged, standing, reviewabil-
ity, and the merits pose discrete, and often complicated, issues
which can best be resolved by recognizing and treating them as
such. 53
The elimination of this part of the current test would thus
greatly simplify and clarify the law of standing to obtain judicial
review.
By contrast, exclusive use of the "injury in fact" test would
be well-considered. In addition to fulfilling the constitutional
requirement of "case" or "controversy" there are several other
reasons for retention of the injury in fact test:
The strongest reason is the principle of elementary justice that
one who is in fact hurt by illegal action should have a remedy.
The second reason is that the artificiality and complexity of the
law of standing would disappear if the courts would follow the
simple idea that one who is in fact hurt may challenge; the large
amount of litigation over the unnecessary complexities of the
law of standing is wasteful. The third reason, applicable in the
federal system, lies in the intent behind the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act.54
The recent trend toward a more liberal interpretation of
50. 397 U.S. at 153.
51. Davis, supra note 11, at 457-58.
52. See, e.g., Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 169 (1970) (concur-
ring opinion), and Phillips, Environmentalists' Suits-Are They Stand-
ing or Falling?, 4 NATURAL REsouRcEs LAWYR 469 (1971).
53. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 170 (1970) (concurring opin-
ion).
54. 3 K. DAvis, ADMinISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 22.02, at 211 (1958).
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standing will probably continue until the Supreme Court has
adopted the "injury in fact" test as the sole basis for determining
standing to obtain judicial review of agency actions. Justices
Brennan and White have already strenuously argued for this
position.5 Several arguments have been made against having
"injury in fact" as the sole test but none of these stands up under
direct scrutiny. The law of standing is not the proper concept to
ensure that courts refrain from hearing nonjusticiable contro-
versies, that the issues are properly framed, or that the case is
competently presented. Other more direct and efficient concepts
exist to assist the courts in these areas.56 The objection has also
been raised that making "injury in fact" the sole test will flood
court dockets. This result is highly doubtful considering the
large amount of time and money necessary to bring an environ-
mental action. Additionally, simplification of the law of stand-
ing would virtually eliminate the large amount of time now con-
sumed by litigating that issue. This should more than offset dif-
ficulties caused by any increase in the number of suits. Since
the arguments against further simplification and liberalization
of the law of standing are unpersuasive, the Supreme Court
should establish "injury in fact" as the exclusive test for deter-
mining standing to obtain judicial review.*
55. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 170 (1970) (concurring opinion).
56. Davis, supra note 11, at 468-71.
* While this comment was at press, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals handed down its decision in San Francisco Tomorrow v.
Romney, No. 72-1969 (9th Cir., Jan. 18, 1973).
1972]
Constitutional Law: Fourth Amendment: Marijuana
Seized in "Pat-Down" Incident to Traffic Violation
Inadmissible in Subsequent Criminal Prosecution
In September 1968, two St. Paul policemen observed the
driver of a car with defective taillights fail to signal for a right
turn. They immediately curbed the vehicle. As the driver got
out of his automobile to approach the squad car, he took an ob-
ject (later discovered to be a loaded pistol) from his pocket or
belt and threw it on the front seat of his car. The officers had
also emerged from their car and, although neither expressed
concern for his personal safety, one policeman began a "pat-
down" search of the driver before putting him in the squad car
to check his driver's license. The officer, in feeling the outside
of the driver's pockets,' detected an object which did not feel
like a gun or knife. As he reached into the pocket, the driver
seized 2 a package from it and dumped part of the contents (la-
ter identified to be marijuana) inside the squad car and on the
ground. Defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana in
violation of Minn. Stat. § 618.02. The trial court denied de-
fendant's motion to suppress the marijuana evidence, holding the
search valid as incident to the arrest. On appeal, the Minnesota
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the search was invalid at
its inception and that the marijuana evidence accordingly should
have been suppressed. State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d
631 (1971).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.8 Searches con-
1. Although the court stated "Officer Patsy testified that he felt
the outside of defendant's pockets," State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 430,
190 N.W.2d 631, 632 (1971), Officer Patsy in fact testified that he reached
immediately inside defendant's pockets (record at 9, 31, 55, 59, 84), which
he does "as a matter of course" (record at 28) upon placing a person in
the squad car.
2. The court's statement that "defendant seized a package," State
v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 430, 190 N.W.2d 631, 632 (1971), is a statement
of the facts clearly in the light most favorable to the party prevailing
at the trial level. Officer Patsy's testimony that defendant removed
the package was contradicted by defendant and three times by the other
arresting officer, both of whom testified that it was Officer Patsy who
removed the package.
3. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
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ducted without a warrant are inherently unreasonable, subject
to certain exceptions. 4  Two such exceptions are searches con-
ducted "incidental to arrest," and searches conducted under the
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by an Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
4. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The excep-
tions include: Consensual searches, Amos v. United States, 255 U.S.
313 (1921); United States v. Page, 302 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1962); United
States v. Sclafani, 265 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 918
(1959); searches made in "hot pursuit" of a suspect, Warden v. Hayden,
387 U.S. 294 (1967); searches of automobiles to prevent loss of evidence,
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (allowing search "where it
is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought." Id. at 153); and searches incident to arrest, Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Harris
v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20 (1925).
The dissent in Curtis attempted to apply the automobile search ex-
ception as well. Noting a number of not completely reconcilable
United States Supreme Court cases, Justice Kelly, in a dissent in which
Justice Odden concurred, attempted to "glean from the language of
[such] cases . . . what the thinking of that court may be on a similar
case." 290 Minn. at 441, 190 N.W.2d at 638. The validity of such guess-
work is questionable, since the Supreme Court has stated explicitly that
it has avoided answering the question of "[w]hether or not a car may
constitutionally be searched incidental to arrest for a traffic offense."
Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220 (1968). More-
over, the cases cited present significantly different factual settings from
Curtis. Following arrests for narcotics, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58 (1967), robbery, Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), va-
grancy, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), and reckless driv-
ing, Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968), defendants
in the cases cited were talken into actual physical custody, and the
courts' opinions focus on subsequent searches of their cars.
Furthermore, the reasoning of the dissenters seems to be that a
valid search of the auto inferentially justifies search of the driver. Such
logic overlooks the possibility that the theory upon which a car search
is based may be different from that upon which search of the driver is
based. For example, the dissenters rely in part on Chambers v. Ma-
roney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), where the Supreme Court upheld a car
search conducted under the Carroll rule, which allows search of a mo-
bile vehicle when there is "[p]robable cause for believing that the auto-
mobile which he stops and seizes has contraband . .. therein ... ."
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 156 (1925) (see supra). The
Court has stated explicitly, however, that even with probable cause,
" see no ground for expanding the ruling in the CarrolL case tojustify [a search of the occupants of a car] as incident to the search of a
car." United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 587 (1948). See also L. TIF-
FANY, D. McINTm & D. ROTENBERG, DETEcTIoN OF CRME 173 (1967);
Lecture by John B. Hotis, FBI National Academy Sectional Retraining
Session, July 1, 1970, in FBI LAw ENFORCuMV But rrx 9 (1971).
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doctrine of "stop and frisk." Strict limitations circumscribe the
incidental search exception. First, only a valid arrest will sup-
port an incidental search;5 thus, a search is illegal, regardless
of what is thereby discovered, 6 if the arrest is a mere pretext
for the search 7 or if no arrest is made at all.8 Second, inci-
dental searches must be reasonable in scope.0 Finally, they must
be reasonable with regard to the objects sought.10 "Reasonable
objects" have been held to include only fruits of the crime, in-
strumentalities used to commit the crime, weapons, contraband
and evidence." Similarly, the doctrine of stop and frisk also is
carefully limited in basis and scope. Thus, an officer may con-
duct a cursory pat-down for weapons only when there is (1)
a reasonable factual basis for believing that the person stopped
is about to commit or has committed a crime, and (2) fear for
the officer's safety caused by a reasonable suspicion that the per-
son is armed and dangerous. 12
The extent to which either search-incident doctrine or the
law of stop and frisk will support searches of traffic viola-
tors is a controversial question. The courts have divided on
two issues: (1) the circumstances, beyond the mere fact of a traf-
fic arrest, which are necessary to justify such searches; and (2)
the proper scope of such a search when sufficient justification
exists. The minority rule considers a traffic arrest in itself suf-
ficient justification for either a full search of the violator 3 or a
5. E.g., Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);
Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Ortiz v. United
States, 317 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1963).
6. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Henry
v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Pigg v. United States, 337 F.2d 302
(8th Cir. 1964).
7. E.g., Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.
1968); Fields v. State, 463 P.2d 1000 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970); Huebner
v. State, 33 Wis. 2d 505, 147 N.W.2d 646 (1967).
8. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
9. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (search is limited to
arrestee's person and areas within immediate reach or control).
10. E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Weeks v. United
States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
11. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Preston v. United
States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238
(1960); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
12. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See R. OLiPuANT, 42 MINNE-
SOTA PRACTICE MANUAL (Criminal Procedure) § 2.9 at 29 (1970).
13. See, e.g., Neely v. State, 240 Ind. 362, 164 N.E.2d 110 (1960);
Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1967); Adair v. State, 427 S.W.2d 67
(Tex. Crim. App. 1968); Lane v. State, 424 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim. App.),
cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1967).
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frisk.14 However, the majority rule requires some additional
factual showing beyond the traffic arrest itself to justify either
a full search or a frisk.15
Courts following the majority, rule differ as to the addi-
tional facts necessary to justify searches of traffic violators.
Disparate results have been reached on apparently indistinguish-
able fact situations.16 Although the decisions contain language
characteristic both of the stop and frisk and search-incident doc-
trines, many of them have focused on the same elements: the
gravity of the offense, the behavior of the driver and passen-
gers, the crime rate in the area of arrest, the time of day and
the number of officers present in relation to the number of pas-
sengers. Thus the divergent results in such cases may be expli-
cable more in terms of evidentiary determinations rather than
any inconsistency in legal theory.
Curtis places Minnesota among the majority of jurisdictions
which requires something more than a mere traffic stop to sup-
14. The indignity of a frisk, such courts maintain, is outweighed
by the interest of protecting the arresting officer. E.g., Durham v.
Haynes, 258 F. Supp. 452 (E.D. Mo. 1966); People v. Weitzer, 269 Cal.
App. 2d 274, 75 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1969); People v. Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d
719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1968); State v. Coles, 20 Ohio Misc. 12, 48 Ohio
Op. 2d 309, 249 N.E.2d 553 (1969).
15. See note 16 infra.
16. Compare People v. Clayton, 13 Cal. App. 3d 335, 91 CaL Rptr. 494(1970) (defendant, stopped for defective stoplight, flapped his arms dur-
ing the stop); People v. Hubbard, 9 Cal. App. 3d 827, 88 Cal. Rptr. 411(1970) (three occupants of a car, stopped for running a stop sign, got out
and confronted the officers); Roybal v. People, 166 Cal. 541, 444 P.2d
875 (1968) (defendant stopped for defective taillights, passenger leaned
forward out of view of officer); People v. Hollman, 46 Ill. 2d 311, 236
N.E.2d 7 (1970) (defendant, stopped for failing to signal a turn, could
not locate driver's license and "backed away" from the officers); State
v. Campbell, 53 N.J. 230, 250 A.2d 1 (1969) (driver of a car with one
headlight could produce no driver's license or registration permit and
gave an unsatisfactory explanation of car's ownership); and People v.
Smith, 308 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1970) (speeder, driving an unregistered vehi-
cle, presented a forged operator's license), in which searches were up-
held, with People v. Kiefer, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 3 Cal. 3d 807, 478 P.2d
449 (1970) ("furtive gesture" made toward the floor after arrest for
speeding); People v. Reed, 37 IlL 2d 91, 227 N.E.2d 69 (1967) (driver of
car with missing license plate exhibited nervous behavior); People v.
Peck, 31 Mich. App. 667, 188 N.W.2d 28 (1971) (driver, stopped for
speeding, placed object in seat console); Thompson v. State, 487 P.2d
737 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (passenger in car with defective taillights
made "suspicious movements"); and Commonwealth v. Dussel, 439 Pa.
392, 266 A.2d 659 (1970) (defendant ran red light, could produce no
registration card, and stated that use of the auto was with the permis-




port the search of the driver. Dicta in previous cases 17 were
elevated to a rule of law: absent such circumstances as would
reasonably cause police officers to fear for their safety, searches
of traffic violators are impermissible.'8 However, the precise
logic by which the court reached this conclusion is unclear. The
Curtis opinion, like many others on the subject, may be ana-
lyzed in terms either of search-incident doctrine or the law of
stop and frisk.
First, the court arguably might have held the search in Cur-
tis impermissible under search-incident doctrine. The court
cited two leading cases with apparent approval, People v. Marsh",
and Amador-Gonzales v. United States,2 0 which specify the per-
missible objects of a search incident to arrest:
(1) the fruits of the crime; (2) instrumentalities used to commit
the crime; (3) weapons or like material which put the arresting
officer in danger or might facilitate escape; (4) contraband, the
possession of which is a crime . . . and . . . (5) material which
constitutes evidence that the person arrested has committed it.21
17. "Police officers may not ordinarily make searches upon appre-
hending motorists for simple traffic violations upon the slightest hint of
illegality." State v. Harris, 265 Minn. 260, 268, 121 N.W.2d 327, 333
(1963) (dictum). Officers "had no authority to search defendant's
car . . . as an incident to an arrest for changing lanes without signal-
ing .... ." State v. Clifford, 273 Minn. 249, 254, 141 N.W.2d 124, 127
(1966) (dictum).
18. The apprehending officer has the "burden of proving probable
cause for conducting the search of defendant's person in all but the
most serious traffic violations." State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 437,
190 N.W.2d 631, 636 (1971). Examples of what may constitute probable
cause cited in Curtis are:
circumstances where (a) a motorist is known by the police to
be habitually armed. or to have a record of assaultive be-
havior, or (b) he assumes a hostile or threatening attitude when
stopped, or (c) the police, after stopping him, by cursory exami-
nation and without search have valid reason to believe the
motorist is engaged in the commission of a more serious crime.
Id. at 437, 190 N.W.2d at 636. See also text accompanying note 40 infra.
The court appears to suggest that sufficient justification for a
search also might follow from a valid reason for requiring defendant to
enter the squad car. The court states that it was
not to be understood as holding that the police have no right,
for their own protection, to search a person before placing him
in a squad car if there is a valid reason for requiring him to
enter the vehicle and it is not merely an excuse for an other-
wise improper search.
Id. This language could be construed as indicating that a valid reason
for placing defendant in the car will in itself support a search.
19. 20 N.Y.2d 98, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789, 228 N.E.2d 783 (1967).
20. 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968).
21. Id. at 314. These have been held proper objects of a search




Since none of the permissible objects related to a traffic offense,
these two cases therefore concluded that the incident-to-arrest
rule could not support a search of a traffic violator.22
It appears inescapable, however, that one of the permissible
objects-weapons-potentially may be involved in a traffic ar-
rest; the traffic violator may be armed. Thus, if the court held
the search impermissible under search-incident theory, it must
have created an exception to the rule that a search for weapons is
permissible. That is, weapon searches are permissible when in-
cidental to any arrest other than a traffic arrest absent addi-
tional facts which justify a search in the traffic context. How-
ever, since the essence of search-incident doctrine is that an ar-
rest in itself provides sufficient grounds to support a search,2 it
seen s conceptually more sound to view the court as having
placed the problem beyond the ambit of traditional search-inci-
dent doctrine.
On the other hand, an additional factual showing is cen-
tral to the law of stop and frisk. Under this doctrine, the addi-
tional factual showing which justifies a frisk is that
the police officer be able to point to specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.2 4
22. Moreover, it might be persuasively argued that because the
suspect is detained only momentarily, a traffic stop does not fit neatly
into the tight contours of "arrest," and that the traditional law of arrest
should not be fully applicable to the stopping of a motorist. Various
courts have held, for example, that the Miranda warning need not be
given traffic violators. See State v. Tellez, 6 Ariz. App. 251, 431 P.2d
691 (1967); State v. Smith, 181 Neb. 846, 152 N.W.2d 16 (1967); State v.
Zucconi, 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (1967); The Curtis court did
not question whether a traffic stop constitutes a true arrest as contem-
plated by search-incident doctrine, but there is authority that a stop to
issue a citation, ticket or other notice to appear in court does not consti-
tute an arrest. See, e.g., Barrier v. Alexander, 100 Cal. App. 2d 497, 224
P.2d 436 (1950); Conn v. Commonwealth, 387 S.W.2d 285 (Ky. Crim.
App. 1965); State v. Murray, 106 N.H. 71, 205 A 2d 29 (1964); Jones v.
State, 8 Misc. 2d 140, 167 N.Y.S.2d 536 (1957); City of Toledo v. Lowen-
berg, 99 Ohio App. 165, 131 N.E.2d 682 (1955). However, other courts
have held that the restraint on the traffic violator's freedom of
movement which occurs when he is pulled over by the police does
amount to an arrest. See, e.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98(1959); United States v. Davis, 265 F. Supp. 358 (W.D. Pa. 1967); United
States v. Washington, 249 F. Supp. 40 (D.D.C. 1965); Cf. United States v.
Souther, 211 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Tenn. 1962). See also MinN. STAT.
§ 629.32 (1969): "An arrest is made by the actual restraint of the person
of the defendant or by his submission to the custody of the officer .. .
23. See note 4 supra.
24. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
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Moreover, several portions of the Curtis opinion suggest that
the court relied on stop and frisk law to invalidate the search.
The two seminal stop and frisk cases, Terry v. Ohio2 5 and Sibron
v. New York, 26 are cited with approval.27 The court's require-
ment that the policeman have concern for his personal safety is
strikingly similar to the requirement of the Supreme Court
in Terry that the officer observe "unusual conduct which leads
him to believe in light of his experience . . . that the person
with whom he is dealing is armed and presently dangerous. ' 2
The examples presented by the court29 to demonstrate situations
in which a search of a traffic violator would be valid stress the
court's concern for the safety of the arresting officer and thus
further bolster the view of Curtis as a stop-and-frisk case.30
Since the search in Curtis was declared invalid at its incep-
tion, an important issue was never reached: the permissible scope
of an initially justifiable search. The legal theory upon which
the decision was based assumes greater significance here. If
the court applied search-incident doctrine, the scope arguably is
the same as that of any incidental search. If the doctrine of
stop-and-frisk was employed, however, then the permissible
scope is only that allowed under Terry. It is difficult to con-
ceive how search-incident doctrine could be reinstated for scope
purposes since the underpinnings of that doctrine were removed
in Curtis by the requirement of an additional factual showing.
Moreover, the extensive reliance on stop-and-frisk principles in
the determination of initial justification for the search in Curtis
indicates that the scope question also should be resolved under
stop-and-frisk law. Consequently, the permissible scope for
weapon searches of traffic violators should be restricted to "a
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
26. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
27. State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 432, 190 N.W.2d 631, 633 (1971).
28. 392 U.S. at 30.
29. See note 18 supra. As to example (c) in note 18, "evidence
of a more serious crime" would remove the fact situation from that of
the routine traffic offense. The example illustrates what Chief Justice
Warren referred to in Terry as the "need of an escalating set of flexible
responses, graduated in relation to the amount of information [the offi-
cers] possess." 392 U.S. at 10.
30. The Curtis fact situation might well have justified a frisk un-
der a Terry standard, except for the fact that both officers specifically
testified they felt no fear for their personal safety. The dissenters in
Curtis fault the majority for failing to adopt "an objective standard
similar to the one proposed in Terry ... based upon prudence and
caution rather than on probable cause. . . ." 290 Minn. at 465, 190
N.W.2d at 651. However, it would appear that the standard adopted
by the Curtis majority is virtually identical to that of Terry.
[Vol. 57:414
CASE COMMENTS
limited patting of the outer clothing of the suspect for con-
cealed objects which might be used as instruments of assault"31
However, the permissible scope of such a search arguably is
the same under both stop-and-frisk and search-incident law. In
Chimel v. CaUfornia32 the Supreme Court reiterated its holding
in Terry that "[tihe scope of [a] search must be 'strictly tied
to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initia-
tion possible,"33 and noted further that "a similar analysis un-
derlies the 'search incident to arrest' principle, and marks its
proper extent."34 The Chimel Court thus invalidated a search
of the full house in which defendant was arrested because the
search went beyond "the area from within which he might gain
possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."3 5 In short, the
search was unreasonable in scope because the possibility of de-
fendant's obtaining a weapon in the area searched was re-
mote. Accordingly, regardless of the legal theory employed in
Curtis, since the purpose of searches of traffic violators is the
discovery of weapons, such searches should be limited to that
which is reasonably necessary for their discovery-i.e., a frisk.30
Despite the ambiguity surrounding the theoretical basis for
the decision, the result in Curtis was sound. Since searches of
pedestrians without cause are invalid,3 7 it seems consistent to re-
fuse to permit searches of traffic violators without some eviden-
tiary showing in addition to the mere fact of a traffic arrest.
Such a rule fully accords with one of the major policy aims of
the fourth amendment, that is, the prevention of arbitrary law
enforcement inherent in overly broad police discretion. Since
few motorists can drive without committing some infraction, a
rule which would allow searches based simply upon commission
of a traffic offense would grant the police authority to stop
31. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65 (1968).
32. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). See text accompanying note 10 supra.
33. Id. at 762.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 763.
36. Although the holding of the court is restricted to a search of
the person, similar and often identical considerations underlie the search
of a traffic violator's auto. In the few instances when a search of the
auto is justified, a proper scope would seem to encompass only that
area of the auto within the driver's easy reach. "[I] f there is a criminal
suspect close enough to the automobile so that he might get a weapon
from it or destroy evidence within it, the police may make a search of
appropriately limited scope." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
461, n.18 (1971).
37. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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and search virtually every driver.88 Discretion so broad as to
permit discriminatory enforcement and harassment should be
condemned here as in other contexts.39 Furthermore, the char-
acter of the typical motorist is not so markedly malicious as to
create a presumption of danger which would validate searches in
this context without some additional factual showing; any
safety provided police officers under such a rule would be far
outweighed by the freedom sacrificed. Thus, a traffic violation
should support a search only upon a showing that the arresting
officer reasonably feared for his safety and such a search should
be strictly limited to a cursory pat-down for weapons.40
38. [T]he practical effect of a rule permitting warrantless
"full" searches incident to most traffic arrests (or for that mat-
ter incident to status crimes) is fearsome to imagine. . . . The
rule that a full search without a warrant will be supported by
any lawful arrest gives dangerously broad discretion to the po-
lice officers who must apply it. Logically and consistently ap-
plied, such a rule endangers the rights of the physician hurry-
ing to a night call who runs a stop sign, or the young woman
with her bags packed on her way back to college, or the cor-
porate executive arrested for criminal conspiracy under the
antitrust laws, or of the civil servant accused of tax fraud, or of
any one of us a police officer-for whatever secret motive or
for no reason at all-wishes to search without the hindrance of
normal Fourth Amendment protections.
United States v. Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (J.
Wright's dissent).
39. "[Glood faith on the part of the arresting officers is not
enough." If subjective good faith alone were the test, the
protections of the Fourth Amendment would evaporate, and
the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects," only in the discretion of the police.
Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964) (citation omitted).
[TIhe forefathers, after consulting the lessons of history,
designed our Constitution to place obstacles in the way of a too
permeating police surveillance, which they seemed to think was
a greater danger to a free people than the escape of some crim-
inals from punishment.
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948).
40. See ALl, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 36-37
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970):
§ SS 3.02. Search Incidental to Arrest for Minor Offenses.
(1) Minor Offenses. The searches and seizures authorized by
the other sections of this Article shall not be authorized if the
arrest is on a charge of committing a "violation" . . . a traffic
offense, or a misdemeanor other than a traffic offense the ele-
ments of which involve no unlawful possession or violent, or
intentionally or recklessly dangerous, conduct: Provided, That
this subsection shall not be construed to forbid the search for
dangerous weapons . . . authorized by [stop and frisk sections
of the code].
